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“DODD-FRANK 2.0: CREATING
INTERACTIVE HOME-LOAN DISCLOSURES
TO ENABLE SHREWD CONSUMER
DECISION-MAKING”
Debra Pogrund Stark1
Jessica M. Choplin2
Mark LeBoeuf3
Andrew Pizor4
I. INTRODUCTION
rior to 2010, the primary means that Congress employed to pro-
tect borrowers from entering into predatory home loans was to re-
quire lenders to provide borrowers with forms that disclosed the eco-
nomic terms of the home loan they were applying for.5 Policy-makers 
                                                            
1  Professor of Law, The John Marshall Law School. She thanks Dean Corkery 
and Associate Dean Ruebner for awarding her a summer research grant to support 
this scholarship and Victor Salas for his research assistance. 
2  Ph.D., Associate Professor of Psychological Science, DePaul University. 
3  Ph.D., DePaul University. 
4  Attorney, National Consumer Law Center. 
5 Truth in Lending Act, Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146 (1968) (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1693r (2012); Real Estate Settlement Procedures 
Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-533, 88 Stat. 1724 (1974) (codified as amended at 12 
U.S.C. §§ 2601-2617 2012).). “By making information on the settlement process 
available to home buyers in advance of settlement and requiring advance disclosure 
of settlement charges, it is expected that any unnecessary or unreasonably high set-
tlement charges will be reduced or eliminated.” S. REP. NO. 93-866, at 3 (1974); 
Federal laws facilitated the abandonment by many states of usury law limitations 
on how high an interest rate a lender could charge on a home loan, Depository In-
stitutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 
Stat. 132 (1980) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.) (preempt-
ing state usury laws, allowing states to opt out of this preemption, with only fifteen 
states doing so); and while there were some federal statutes that prohibited certain 
P
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expected that borrowers would carefully read and understand these 
forms and that they would use them to shop around for loans with the 
best terms possible.6 However, as home loan products increased in 
complexity, and credit began to be extended in a sub-prime market, 
the offered loan terms often contained highly problematic features 
that were not adequately highlighted or explained in the disclosure 
forms.  Problems included loans that were overpriced,7 unaffordable,8
and contained otherwise risky features likely to lead to default.9 The 
Federal government’s reliance on home loan disclosure forms to pre-
vent lenders from making and borrowers from taking problematic 
home loans was a dismal failure. A large number of borrowers, many 
without realizing it,10 entered into overpriced and unaffordable home 
                                                            
abusive settlement charges, they applied only to extremely high cost, non-purchase 
money home loans (Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act of 1994, Pub. L. 
No. 103-325, 108 Stat. 2190 (1994) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
15 U.S.C.) (as implemented by Regulation Z,  12 CFR § 226.32 (2014)) and lend-
ers avoided these protections by making loans just under the triggering interest 
rates, fees, and closing costs. 
6 “Home buyers who would otherwise shop around for settlement services, and 
thereby reduce their total settlement costs are presently prevented from doing so 
because frequently they are not apprised of the costs of these services until the set-
tlement date or are not aware of the nature of the settlement services that will be 
provided. The disclosure provisions. . .should ameliorate or eliminate such prob-
lems.” S. REP. NO. 93-866, at. 3. 
7  An “overpriced” loan is one where the interest rate and fees exceed, some-
times far exceed, what the borrower could have qualified for. ELIZABETH WARREN
& AMELIA TYAGI, THE TWO INCOME TRAP: WHY MIDDLE CLASS MOTHERS AND 
FATHERS ARE GOING BROKE 134 (2003) (estimating that approximately 40% of 
homeowners would have qualified for lower-cost loans than they were induced to 
take by unscrupulous mortgage brokers and lenders). 
8  It was not unusual for borrowers to receive home loans where they were pay-
ing 50% or more of their income to their housing expenses. 
9  An example of a risky and deceptive loan would be one that starts with a 
low, teaser interest rate but within 1-3 years would automatically adjust upward to 
a substantially higher rate. Another example would be a loan that is an interest only 
loan to make the loan look affordable, but that leads to a large balloon payment due 
when the loan matured, thereby increasing the risk of default at that time if the bor-
rower is unable to refinance the debt when it matures. 
10  As described in Stark & Choplin, A Cognitive And Social Psychological 
Analysis of Disclosure Laws and Call For Mortgage Counseling to Prevent Preda-
tory Lending, 16 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 85, 85-131 (2010)[hereafter Psycho-
logical Analysis of Disclosure Laws] many borrowers reported not realizing that 
they had entered into an adjustable rate home loan (note 27 and accompanying text) 
due in large part to mortgage brokers and lenders who engaged in deceptive presen-
tations of the disclosure forms. The article includes descriptions of how unscrupu-
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loans and loans with other risky features (referred to herein as 
“predatory loans”), leading to unprecedented levels of foreclosures.11
As a consequence of the foreclosure crisis, and the great real-
estate recession that began in 2008, Congress further expanded its 
regulation of the home lending industry in an effort to address the 
predatory features of home loans that contributed to the foreclosure 
crisis. However, as discussed in this article, due to the limited nature 
of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 
(“Dodd-Frank”)12 legislation, lenders can continue to make loans 
with predatory features to consumers.13While Congress and the Con-
sumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”) have taken major steps 
forward with new disclosure rules and forms, effective August 1, 
2015,14 we argue in this article these measures are inadequate.  In-
                                                            
lous mortgage brokers and lenders engaged in “bait and switch” and “direction and 
deflection” techniques as well as methods they used to gain the borrower’s trust, in 
order to induce borrowers to enter into overpriced home loans (notes 28-30 and ac-
companying text). The article also analyzed fourteen cognitive and social psycho-
logical factors that cause disclosure forms as currently designed to be ineffective in 
protecting consumers. Id. at 97 (for a summary). It should also be noted that “inter-
est only” loans are a way to mask the unaffordability of a more conventional, fully 
amortizing loan, which would have a higher monthly payment, and that when bor-
rowers noticed they were being offered an adjustable rate loan and raised concern 
with affording the future higher payments they were often told not to worry about 
that because they could always refinance the loan, which is not true, as many 
learned after home prices started to go down. Indeed, the new Loan Estimate form 
makes a reference to the possibility of not being able to refinance.  
11  Since the housing bubble burst, about four million families have lost their 
homes to foreclosure. FORECLOSURE FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL
CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE 
CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES 402
(2011), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf. Between 
2007 and 2012, over 12.5 million homes went into foreclosure, even as homeown-
ers struggled to hang on. CENTER FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, 2013 UPDATE: THE
SPILLOVER EFFECTS OF FORECLOSURE 1 (Aug. 19, 2013), 
http://www.responsiblelending.org/mortgage-lending/research-analysis/2013-
spillover-costs-of-foreclosure.html
12  Referring to Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 
of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376-2223 (2010) [hereinafter Dodd-
Frank].
13  See Section I of this article for an analysis of the “ability to repay” require-
ment and the safe harbor rules relating to “Qualifying Mortgages”. While it is now 
less likely that lenders will make loans that borrowers cannot afford to repay, other 
problematic loan terms such as the loan being “overpriced” or otherwise containing 
risky features are not prohibited. 
14  See Section I of this article describing the key improvements made to the 
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stead, we argue that regulators have taken a step backward in how 
they treat the Annual Percentage Rate (“APR”), a key disclosure of 
the overall price of the loan.15 We report in Section II the results from 
two “APR Experiments.” These experiments found participants were 
only able to identify the lower-cost loan from two offered loans at a 
chance level (44% correct), despite using the CFPB’s new “Loan Es-
timate” disclosure form.  In contrast, 74% were able to do so under 
our proposed enhanced APR disclosure to the Loan Estimate form 
described in Section II below.16
We also argue the Loan Estimate disclosure form provided to 
the borrower at the loan application stage needs to be dramatically 
enhanced to better address the lack of financial literacy among con-
sumers (as evidenced in the results from a financial literacy test that 
we gave participants described in Section II), as well as the cognitive 
barriers and deceptive mortgage sales practices that consumers face. 
We believe revising the Loan Estimate form to make it “interactive” 
in the manner we propose will better address these cognitive barriers 
and common deceptive sales practices that currently impede the ef-
fectiveness of the forms. The deeper level of information that the in-
teractive features can convey will also better facilitate shrewd con-
sumer decision-making not only by financially unsophisticated 
borrowers,17 but by financially sophisticated borrowers as well.18
                                                            
disclosure forms. 
15   The APR is a combination of the interest rate, loan fees, and most of the 
closing costs of the home loan, expressed as a yearly rate over the term of the loan. 
16  In the two loans that participants were asked to compare, the loan with the 
lower APR was at all times lower in total price than the higher APR loan. Because 
this might not be the case throughout the term of the loan, this possibility should be 
addressed in the Loan Estimate though interactive features described in infra note 
17.
17  As discussed in Section III of this article, when there are problematic terms 
in the offered loan these terms could be highlighted in yellow or red and it would 
be mandatory for the consumer to click on the highlighted term and review the ex-
planation before they would be able to sign the disclosure form.  
18  For sophisticated consumers, they could elect to click on a link to a graph 
that depicts over time if it is possible for a lower APR loan to in fact at some points 
be at a higher price than a higher APR loan due to how much earlier than the ma-
turity of the loan the borrower pays off the loan. The interactive features could in-
clude graphs showing how long the borrower would need to hold onto the loan  (for 
example when they are comparing a loan with a lower interest rate but higher clos-
ing costs with a loan with a higher interest rate but lower closing costs), for the 
former loan to be at a lower price than the latter. Conversely, the graph could show 
when the borrower would need to pay off the loan when taking out a higher interest 
rate loan with lower closing costs (compared with a lower interest rate loan with 
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In Section I, we summarize and analyze the Dodd-Frank laws 
that were enacted to regulate home loan terms and the key changes 
made to the home loan disclosure rules and forms, critiquing in par-
ticular the changes made to the APR component of the new CFPB 
disclosure form. In Section II, we detail and report on the methods 
and results from two APR Experiments we conducted (one using eye-
tracking technology to see which areas of the disclosure form partici-
pants were looking at and for how long); we also report on the low 
level of financial literacy of the participants reflected in the results of 
the financial literacy test we gave them. In Section III, we consider 
how adding certain interactive features to the Loan Estimate can ad-
dress financial literacy deficiencies and help overcome certain com-
mon deceptive practices that currently impede the effectiveness of 
home-loan disclosure forms. We consider which sections of the Loan 
Estimate form could benefit most from enhanced interactive features, 
including the enhanced APR disclosure that we recommend, and 
what those interactive features might look like. We also recommend 
certain other revisions to the Loan Estimate form for the CFPB to test 
to see if these changes will cause the form to be even more useful to 
consumers
I. FEDERAL REGULATION OF HOME-LOAN TERMS AND CHANGES TO 
DISCLOSURE RULES AND FORMS IN THE WAKE OF THE FORECLOSURE
CRISIS
In 2010, Congress enacted a sweeping series of laws under 
Dodd-Frank.19 In response to the widespread problem of mortgage 
lenders disregarding traditional underwriting practices and, instead, 
making loans without regard for the borrower’s ability to repay, Arti-
cle XIV of Dodd-Frank requires that virtually all home-mortgage 
lenders make a reasonable and good faith determination of the bor-
rower’s ability to repay the loan (the “Ability to Repay Require-
ment”).20 Congress also took steps to reign in the practice of tying 
                                                            
higher closing costs) for the higher interest rate loan with lower closing costs to 
remain the lower priced loan. 
19 Dodd-Frank, supra note 12. 
20 Id. One would think that lenders would not make unaffordable home loans 
since they will suffer losses if the borrower defaults and the fair market value of the 
home does not exceed the debt amount and costs of foreclosure and resale of the 
home. However, originating lenders rarely held onto these unaffordable home loans 
and instead sold them in the secondary market, thus transferring the risk of default 
to others who relied on inflated ratings of these mortgage loan pools from rating 
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mortgage-broker compensation to the terms of a loan, particularly the 
interest rate. 
Before Dodd-Frank, mortgage brokers were often paid a 
“yield spread premium.”  The yield spread is the difference between 
the “par” rate, the lowest rate at which a lender would make a loan to 
a specific borrower, and the rate on the contract the borrower ulti-
mately signed.  The higher the contract rate, the bigger the spread, 
and the bigger the broker’s commission. 21 The practice of paying 
yield spread premiums not only incentivized mortgage brokers to 
place borrowers into higher-cost loans than for which they were qual-
ified, but it also led many mortgage brokers to engage in deceptive 
practices so that consumers would not realize the extent to which 
their loans were overpriced.22 Even though the ban on yield spread 
premiums is an important change, Dodd-Frank does not prevent lend-
ers from tying broker compensation to the size of a loan (the amount 
borrowed).  Further, lenders can still profit by charging excessive in-
terest rates and fees.  Lenders also stand to profit from selling loans 
with terms that are attractive to secondary market participants.23 Con-
sequently, Dodd-Frank and the CFPB’s implementing regulations do 
not eliminate the risk posed by incentives that promote unsafe lend-
ing practices. 
Dodd-Frank and the CFPB’s regulations also establish other 
consumer protections that apply to most home loans including pro-
hibiting lenders from financing abusive forms of credit life insur-
                                                            
agencies who presumed that housing prices would rise indefinitely. 
21 Id.  §1403,  (codified at 15 U.S.C. §1639b, amended as Truth in Lending 
Act §129(B) (as added by § 1402(a) by inserting after subsection (b) a new section: 
“(c) PROHIBITION ON STEERING INCENTIVES”) This new section prohibits 
various steering practices. The amendment includes a prohibition on loan origina-
tors receiving compensation from anyone based on the terms of the loan being 
made other than amount (which we logically infer therefore includes steering based 
on the interest rate being charged). The amendment is complicated and contains 
some exceptions and possible future exemptions, but later attempts to clarify that 
the new section does not permit yield spread premiums or other similar compensa-
tion that would permit the total amount of compensation to vary based on the terms 
of the loan (other than the amount of the principal)). 
22 See Psychological Analysis of Disclosure Laws supra note 10. 
23 See Sean M. Hoskins, Katie Jones, and N. Eric Weiss, Congressional Re-
search Service, An Overview of the Housing Finance System in the United States 
at 12 (Mar. 13, 2013), http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42995.pdf (noting that investors 
include pension funds, domestic banks, foreign banks, and hedge funds.). See gen-
erally, John P. Wiedemer, Real Estate Finance 54-73 (8th Ed. 2001) (describing 
secondary market). 
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ance,24 requiring independent real estate appraisals, prohibiting man-
datory arbitration clauses,25 and capping the amount of time during 
which prepayment charges can be imposed.26 However, the other key 
reforms are more of a “nudge”27 instead of an outright prohibition of 
those problematic terms.28 Dodd-Frank addresses these other prob-
lematic and risky home loan terms29 by prohibiting them only if the 
lender desires to have the loan be considered a “Qualifying Mort-
gage,” but does not require that any home loans in fact be “Qualify-
                                                            
24  15 U.S.C. § 1639c(d). Prohibits single premium credit life insurance, re-
payment insurance, and similar closing costs, versus paying for them in monthly 
installments, which are particularly predatory in nature when a borrower is then in-
duced to frequently refinance the loans with the same charges being re-imposed. 
25  15 U.S.C. § 1639c(e). 
26  15 U.S.C. § 1639c(c). If a loan is permitted to have a prepayment charge 
(i.e. it is a Qualifying Mortgage, not an adjustable rate loan, and the APR is not 
greater than the average of prime offer rates for comparable transactions by 2.5% 
for first mortgage loans or 3.5% for junior loans) then it is restricted to a charge of 
no greater than 3% of the loan balance in year one of the loan, 2% in year 2 and 1% 
in year 3 of the loan. After year 3, no prepayment charges are permitted. This regu-
lation and restriction on prepayment charges is helpful, since now restrictions on 
prepayment charges will be expanded to virtually all home-loans (prior restrictions 
only covered very high cost home loans). However, the new law does permit a sig-
nificant cost to borrowers who might need to prepay their loan during the first three 
years of their loan. In addition, the prepayment charge can be imposed even if in-
terest rates have risen since the loan was first made, in which case the lender might 
even profit from reinvesting the sums advanced early rather than take a loss when 
interest rates have declined. Prior to the foreclosure crisis, prime loans (loans to 
borrowers with good credit and whose financial circumstances complied with pru-
dent underwriting standards) typically did not include prepayment charges; while 
sub-prime loans did. And as previously indicated in WARREN & TYAGI, supra note 
7, many consumers who qualified for a prime loan were induced to take out a high-
er cost sub-prime loan, which then contained not only higher interest and closing 
costs, but also included prepayment charges. It is unclear how lenders will respond 
in structuring their home loans in light of these new rules and the impact of that on 
the frequency with which lenders impose prepayment charges.  
27  R.H. THALER & C.R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT
HEALTH, WEALTH AND HAPPINESS, (Penguin Books 2009). 
28  Rather than prohibit the making of home loans with certain risky or highly 
unfair features, Congress instead provided certain incentives for lenders to make 
more fair loans. 
29  Examples include: negative amortization loans (where the principal amount 
actually increases over the term of the loan), interest only loans (where the borrow-
er will have to pay back the entire principal loan amount when the loan matures), 
loans with very high fees or points relative to the loan amount, or loans containing 
prepayment charges. 
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ing Mortgages.”30
If a home loan meets the definition of a Qualifying Mort-
gage,31 then the Ability to Repay Requirements noted earlier is con-
clusively presumed to be satisfied by the lender.32 If the loan other-
wise complies with the requirements to be a Qualifying Mortgage but 
is a “higher priced home loan,”33 the loan originator will gain only a 
rebuttable presumption of complying with the Ability to Repay Re-
quirement.34 Weaknesses in the rules defining a Qualifying Mortgage 
extended exemptions to certain categories of lenders and the fact that 
some lenders may choose not to make a fully or partially Qualifying 
Mortgage, in turn permits lenders to continue to offer home loans 
with highly problematic features. For example, lenders can charge 
high interest rates and fees in excess of what the borrower might 
qualify for from other lenders based upon their credit score or struc-
ture their loans with risky features such as large prepayment penal-
ties, negative amortization, adjustable rates, or large balloon pay-
ments of principal due at maturity of the loan. Consequently, even 
with the important reforms created by Dodd-Frank, unsophisticated 
borrowers remain vulnerable to taking out loans with highly prob-
lematic terms or features. In light of this reality, mandatory home 
loan disclosure laws and forms remain an important source of federal 
                                                            
30  15 U.S.C. § 1639c(b) Creation of a safe harbor to the Ability to Repay re-
quirement if the loan satisfied the requirements for a “Qualifying Mortgage.” To be 
a Qualifying Mortgage, the loan must: 1) have no negative amortization, 2) not be 
an interest only loan, 3) be a fully amortized loan with no balloon payment and a 
term no greater than 30 years, 4) include documentation of income and financial 
resources of the borrower, 5) comply with the guidelines on debt-to-service ratios 
(which require a 43% debt to service ratio cap), and, 6) points and fees on the loan 
can not be greater than 3% of the loan amount. It should be noted, however, that 
because this 3% figure excludes from its calculation any points charged to discount 
[reduce] the interest rate and the calculation of fees refers only to fees to the lender 
or mortgage broker, and excludes fees for other closing costs, a loan charging fees 
so defined in the 2-3% range may also in the authors’ opinion be indicative of an 
overpriced loan.
31  Qualifying Mortgages are subject to restrictions that prohibit certain higher 
risk loan terms (such as balloon payments), and pricing restrictions, such as the 
amount which the APR and “points and fees” may exceed certain benchmarks. 
32 Id.
33 A “higher priced loan” that would cause an otherwise Qualifying Mortgage 
with a conclusive presumption to become a Qualifying Mortgage with only a rebut-
table presumption on compliance with the Ability to Repay Requirement is one 
where the APR is 1.5% greater than the average prime offer rate for a comparable 
first mortgage loan or 3.5% greater for a comparable junior loan.  
34 15 U.S.C. § 1639c(b). 
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protection and, potentially, a way to empower consumers to make 
shrewd home-loan decisions. 
Beginning in 2008, the Federal government responded to the 
foreclosure crisis by taking steps to modify the home loan disclosure 
forms and rules. One key change proposed in 2008 and made effec-
tive 2010,35 was better disclosure at the loan application stage wheth-
er the loan was a fixed-rate or adjustable-rate loan, and to disclose 
how high the interest rate and monthly payments could rise during 
the term of the loan.36 This was a very important change to the dis-
closure forms because many consumers under the earlier disclosure 
forms failed to realize they entered into an adjustable-rate home 
loan.37 Another key change that became effective in 2010 was to re-
strict the lender’s ability to later increase many of the fees and costs 
initially quoted on the disclosure form provided to the borrower at the 
time of the loan application.38 Lenders were required to provide loan 
applicants with a  “good faith estimate”39 of the expected settlement 
                                                            
35  Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA): Rule to Simplify and Im-
prove the Process of Obtaining Mortgages and Reduce Consumer Settlement Costs, 
73 Fed. Reg. 68, 204-01 (Nov. 17, 2008) (codified at 24 CFR 203 and 24 CFR 
3500) [hereinafter RESPA Final Rule]. 
36 Id.
37 See Psychological Analysis of Disclosure Laws, supra note 10. See also
Stark, Choplin, & LeBoeuf, Ineffective In Any Form: How Confirmation Bias and 
Distractions Undermine Improved Home-Loan Disclosures, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE
377-400 (2013), which noted how the manner in which the adjustable rate feature 
of the offered loan had previously been disclosed in the Truth in Lending Act dis-
closure form made it very difficult for borrowers to notice it was an adjustable rate 
home loan. Participants in experiments reported upon in the article that used the 
TILA disclosure form fared much more poorly than did participants using the new 
disclosure form at noticing the loan was an adjustable rate loan.
38 See RESPA Final Rule, Supra note 33. As summarized in  CFPB, Final rule 
on simplified and improved mortgage disclosures, Detailed Summary of the Rule, , 
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201311_cfpb_tila-respa_detailed-summary.pdf  
[hereinafter Final Rule Summary] there are three categories of charges that cannot 
increase at all (subject to certain exceptions): “(1) the creditor’s or mortgage bro-
ker’s charges for its own services; 2) charges for services provided by an affiliate 
of the creditor or mortgage broker; and (3) charges for services for which the credi-
tor or mortgage broker does not permit the consumer to shop.” As noted by the 
CFPB: “Charges for other services can increase, but generally not by more than 
10%, unless an exception applies.” The CFPB notes four examples of exceptions: 
“(1) the consumer asks for a change; (2) the consumer chooses a service provider 
that was not identified by the creditor; (3) information provided at application was 
inaccurate or becomes inaccurate; or (4) the Loan Estimate expires.” Id. at 5-6.
39  12 C.F.R. §§ 1024.2(b) (defining “good faith estimate or GFE”), 1024.7; 
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charges associated with the loan within three days of the loan appli-
cation; but before the 2008 change, a lender or mortgage broker could 
quote one set of fees and costs in the initial disclosures and then 
charge a higher set of fees and costs at the closing.  As a result of this 
loophole, borrowers were exposed to the risk of intentional “bait and 
switch.” Despite the 2008 change, however, there is still no clear, 
statutory remedy for violations of the good faith estimate.40
Another important reform enacted in 2008 was to forbid lend-
ers from charging a borrower any fees, except for fees associated 
with obtaining a credit report until after the consumer was given the 
Loan Estimate form.41 This is an important change because when a 
borrower incurs substantial fees in connection with a loan applica-
tion, the borrower is more likely to proceed with the loan due to those 
“sunk costs,”42 even if a borrower is disappointed with aspects of the 
offered loan as disclosed in the Loan Estimate. 
In Section 1032(f) of Dodd-Frank, Congress mandated that 
the CFPB issue proposed rules and model disclosure forms in 2012, 
and in the following year issued its “Final Rule on simplified and im-
proved mortgage disclosures” (the “Final Rule”); the feature was 
made effect on August 1, 2015. A key change to the disclosure forms 
under the Final Rule is to integrate the Truth in Lending Act 
(“TILA”) 43 and Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (“RESPA”)44
disclosures45 and certain newly required disclosures, so that borrow-
                                                            
RESPA Final Rule, supra note 33; see 12 U.S.C. § 2604(c) (requiring good faith 
estimate of charges to accompany special information booklet); 12 C.F.R. § 
1024.2(b) (defining “application”). 
40  Though Regulation X specifies that a violation of the good faith estimate 
requirements constitutes a violation of section 5 of RESPA, the Act provides no 
remedy for such violations. Collins v. FMHA-USDA, 105 F.3d 1366, 1368 (11th 
Cir. 1997) (no private right of action for failure to provide good faith estimate). 
RESPA originally included a private right of action and statutory damages, but that 
provision was repealed in 1976.  Pub. L. No. 94-205, § 5, 89 Stat. 1157 (1976). 
41  RESPA Final Rule, supra note 33. 
42 H.R. Arkes & C. Blumer, The Psychology of Sunk Cost, 35 ORG. BEHAV.
AND HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 124, 124–140 (1985); H.R. Arkes & L. Hutzel, 
The Role of Probability of Success Estimates in the Sunk Cost Effect, 13 ORG.
BEHAV. AND HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 295, 295–306 (2000). 
43 Truth in Lending Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-321 (Title I §104), 82 Stat. 
147 (May 29, 1968), codified at 15 U.S.C. §1601.
44 Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-533 (Title 12 
Chapter 27 of the United States Code), 88 Stat. 1724 (INSERT YEAR) codified at
12 U.S.C Section 2601. 
45  The two forms also include information from other mandated disclosures 
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ers receive a single “Loan Estimate” disclosure document within 
three days of the loan application46 (in place of the Good Faith Esti-
mate and the Truth-in-Lending disclosure) and a single “Closing Dis-
closure” three days before the closing date47 (in place of the HUD-1 
Statement and TILA disclosure). We agree that creating a single dis-
closure form at the loan application stage and a single disclosure 
form at the closing stage is likely to be a good idea. Consumers are 
more likely to carefully review the disclosure form when there is just 
one document to review versus many, especially when the infor-
mation on the multiple forms overlap.48  In explaining their rationale 
behind combining the disclosure forms in this fashion, the CFPB in-
dicated that not only was the information on the prior forms overlap-
ping, the language used was also inconsistent, noting that the former 
disclosure forms were created under two different federal laws.49 The 
                                                            
such as the appraisal notice under the Equal Credit opportunity act and the servic-
ing application disclosure under RESPA. See Final Rule Summary, supra note 36, 
at 3. 
46  Due to the problem of sunk costs (which covers not only the expenditure of 
money, but also the expenditure of time) the sooner that the borrower receives the 
Loan Estimate the better in order to enhance the borrower’s ability to reject a prob-
lematic loan and shop around and seek Loan Estimates for loans from other lenders 
with better terms. The Final Rules define “application” as the consumer’s name, 
income, and social security number to obtain the credit report, the property address, 
an estimate of the value of the property, and the mortgage loan amount sought. See
Final Rule Summary supra note 36, at 4. The Final Rule also requires that if a 
lender or mortgage broker provides consumers with written estimates prior to ap-
plication, including in advertisements, that the estimates contain a disclaimer so 
that Consumers do not think the estimates have the same legal consequences as if it 
they were the Loan Estimate form. Id.
47  Obtaining the Closing Disclosure three days before closing is better for con-
sumers than  obtaining it at the closing because it provides time for the consumer to 
digest the numbers, make sure they are not impermissibly higher than numbers in 
the Loan Estimate, and then insist that any errors or violations of law are corrected 
before the closing. It also should provide consumers with better notice of the exact 
amount of money they will receive or have to pay at the closing. 
48  It is not necessarily the case that one form will always be better than two 
forms, especially if two forms address issues that are clearly separate and unique 
from each other. However, two forms are extremely likely to be problematic in cas-
es like the difference between the HUD-1 and TILA forms, when the differences in 
content between them is unclear and consumers do not know where they need to 
look to collect information. 
49  The Good Faith Estimate was designed by the Department of Housing and 
Urban Development (“HUD”) under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act and 
the Truth-in-Lending disclosure was first designed by the Board of Governors of 
the Federal Reserve System under the Truth in Lending Act. See Final Rule Sum-
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new Loan Estimate form is designed to help consumers “understand 
the key features, costs and risks of the mortgage loan for which they 
are applying,”50 and the Closing Disclosure is designed “to provide 
disclosures that will be helpful to consumers in understanding all of 
the costs of the transaction.”51 The CFPB tested the Loan Estimate 
and Closing Disclosure forms in comparison with the current disclo-
sure forms and reported that, on average, the new integrated forms 
provided statistically significant better performance.52
Overall, we agree with the CFPB’s statement: “The forms use 
clear language and design to make it easier for consumers to locate 
key information, such as the interest rate, monthly payments, and 
costs to close the loan. The forms also provide more information to 
help consumers decide whether they can afford the loan and to com-
pare the cost of different loan offers, including the cost of the loans 
over time”53 and that the Loan Estimate is now a more helpful disclo-
sure on the “key features, costs, and risks of the mortgage loan for 
which they are applying,”54 yet we believe the Loan Estimate form 
can be made an even stronger tool for consumers.55
One key change in the new Loan Estimate form that we hy-
pothesized would be a major set-back to aiding consumer decision 
                                                            
mary, supra note 36, at 2.
50 Id. at 3. 
51 Id. We believe that another key function of the Closing Disclosure is to help 
the consumer check to make sure that the closing costs reflected in the Closing 
Disclosure have not increased from the costs reflected in the Loan Estimate beyond 
what is permitted by the law. This article focuses on the Loan Estimate disclosure 
form  
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 Id.
55  We do not focus on the new Closing Disclosure form in this article because 
the central focus of this article is improving consumer decision-making on whether 
to take out an offered home loan at the loan application stage. The key function of 
the Closing Disclosure form is not to aid with that decision but instead to disclose 
whether the closing costs quoted on the loan have inappropriately risen and to de-
tail all of the other closing costs (if the consumer is also purchasing the real estate). 
Having said that, if consumers fail to obtain an interest rate lock after they have ap-
plied for the home loan and before the closing, then it is critical for the consumer to 
check in the Closing Disclosure form what the interest rate is. Also, we recommend 
that better protections be enacted to limit the lender from changing the loan product 
offered, or adding to the loan a prepayment charge, in situations where the product 
offered is inappropriate or not available in order to reduce bait and switch type 
fraud. If these changes are permitted, they should be better disclosed to borrowers 
when they occur. 
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making was the decision to de-emphasize the APR disclosure. The 
APR is a combination of the interest charged, loan fees, and most of 
the closing costs expressed as a rate over the term of the loan. The 
CFPB moved the APR from its prominent location on the TILA dis-
closure form (one of four large boxes at the top of page 1) to a single 
line on page 3 of the new Loan Estimate disclosure form. The APR 
had, until this change, been a centerpiece of the federal TILA since 
the Act became law in the United States in 1968. 
The APR is the unit price of credit. “Just as the consumer is 
told the price of milk per quart and the price of gasoline per gallon, 
so must the buyer of credit be told the ‘unit price.’”56 As such, the 
APR is a single piece of information that conveys a sense of the 
overall price/cost of a home loan and is intended to be the primary 
comparative tool for prices. The APR provides a simpler means to 
compare the overall price of loans with different interest rates and 
closing costs.  The APR is disclosed in advertisements for nearly all 
consumer credit: it appears prominently in the documentation accom-
panying forms of credit as diverse as credit cards, auto loans, payday 
loans, mortgages, retail installment sales contracts, and unsecured 
personal loans.  These disclosures are intended to promote consum-
ers’ informed use of credit.  As Congress explained in TILA’s decla-
ration of purpose: 
The Congress finds that economic stabilization would 
be enhanced and the competition among the various 
financial institutions and other firms engaged in the 
extension of consumer credit would be strengthened 
by the informed use of credit. The informed use of 
credit results from an awareness of the cost thereof by 
consumers.  It is the purpose of this subchapter to as-
sure a meaningful disclosure of credit terms so that 
the consumer will be able to compare more readily 
the various credit terms available to him and avoid the 
uninformed use of credit . . . 57
The more informed the consumer is about the price and other 
key terms of the loan, the more able the consumer will be to shop 
around for a loan with the best terms available in the marketplace.  
TILA requires creditors to disclose an APR that is based on a set of 
                                                            
56  90 Cong. Rec. S2042 (daily ed. Jan. 31, 1967) (statement of Sen. William 
Proxmire). Senator Proxmire was one of the chief advocates of the Truth in Lend-
ing Act in Congress. 
57  Truth in Lending Act, § 102, 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a) (1968) 
Stark Article (final).docx (Do Not Delete) 1/7/15 8:08 PM
108 Loyola Consumer Law Review Vol. 27:1 
standardized rules,58 enabling consumers to compare the cost of oth-
erwise diverse loan products on an apples-to-apples basis.  This is in 
notable contrast to other aspects of credit, such as the duration of a 
loan, the method of calculating interest, as well as the number, 
amount, and frequency of payments, which can vary widely.  By us-
ing the APR, “a shopper can tell whether a two-week loan is cheaper 
than a six-month loan by looking at just one number,”  and a “unitary 
shopping instrument”59 informs the consumer which of two loans has 
a lower cost of credit, assuming both loans have the same term. .60
Although using the APR is simple, calculating it is complex. 
It is derived from the relationship of the amount financed, the pay-
ment schedule, and the total finance charges anticipated on a debt.61
The amount financed is relatively straightforward: it is the real pro-
ceeds of the loan — the sum of money the borrower may use after the 
lender deducts any fees or charges.  The payment schedule is the tim-
ing for repaying the loan.  A loan may be repaid in a single lump sum 
or through multiple payments of the same or different amounts at 
regular or irregular intervals as set forth in the contract between the 
lender and borrower.  The finance charge, however, has a more tech-
nical definition: in general, it includes any charge payable by the con-
sumer and imposed by the creditor as an incident to or a condition of 
the extension of credit.62  The total finance charge primarily consists 
of interest charged on the loan and some of the fees or closing costs 
that the creditor imposes. 
Calculating the APR “is sufficiently complicated that, practi-
cally speaking, no one attempts it by hand.”63  An appendix to the 
regulations implementing TILA includes pages of instructions for 
calculating an APR, using procedures not encountered in the typical 
                                                            
58 See 12 C.F.R. Part 1026, Appendix J (“Annual Percentage Rate Computa-
tions for Closed-End Credit Transactions”). 
59  Elizabeth Renuart & Diane E. Thompson, The Truth, the Whole Truth, and 
Nothing but the Truth: Fulfilling the Promise of Truth in Lending, 25 YALE J. ON 
REG. 181, 188 (2008). 
60 That is, two weeks or six months in the above example. The issue of how to 
factor in and disclose the impact of a consumer paying off the loan early is dis-
cussed in Section III of this article. The problem of not all of the closing costs re-
lated to the loan factoring into the APR is discussed in this Section I of this article. 
61 See NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER, TRUTH IN LENDING § 5.5.1 (8th 
ed. 2012)(describing the derivation of the APR). 
62  15 U.S.C. § 1605(a).  There are a great many nuances and exceptions to the 
definition of “finance charge.”  These are discussed in greater detail in chapter 3 of 
NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER, TRUTH IN LENDING (8th ed. 2012). 
63  Renuart & Thompson, supra note 54, at 210 n.163. 
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high school math class.64  Before computers, creditors determined the 
APR using tables that the Federal Reserve Board developed.  It is, 
therefore, fortunate consumers need not calculate an APR them-
selves.
After being mandatory in the consumer credit market for 
nearly forty years, the APR has become widely recognized.  One 
study found that more than 90% of the U.S. population is aware of 
the APR.65  Yet, despite widespread recognition and the good inten-
tions behind TILA, the APR has been criticized as confusing and in-
effective.  Criticisms include (1) the APR is unreliable because there 
are so many exceptions to costs included in it;66(2) the APR is not 
helpful for adjustable-rate loans; (3) the APR is inaccurate for con-
sumers who plan to sell or refinance in a few years;67 (4) consumers 
do not understand the difference between the APR and the contract 
interest rate;68 and (5) consumers do not understand what goes into 
the APR. These problems are based on a combination of definitions, 
disclosure methods, and practicalities. One of those definitions that 
go into the calculation of the APR that impedes the effectiveness of 
the APR is the term “finance charge.” The current regulations defin-
ing the finance charge exclude a variety of charges (for example, title 
                                                            
64 See 12 C.F.R. pt. 1026, app. J (2011) (stating the formulas necessary to cal-
culate APR). 
65  Renuart & Thompson, supra note 54, at 218, citing Thomas A. Durkin, 
Credit Cards: Use and Consumer Attitudes, 1970-2000, FED. RES. BULL. (2000), at 
631, http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/bulletin/2000/0900lead.pdf.
66  It is unfortunate that the CFPB did not keep in the Final Rule their prior 
proposal to redefine APR to include almost all of the up-front costs of the loan. In-
deed, we believe that all of the up-front true costs of the loan should be included in 
the APR calculation to make it an even more accurate “price” of the loan (although 
this would still not cover prepayment charges since that is not an up-front cost of 
the loan). It appears that the reason for not making this change was because lenders 
complained that it would lead to loans being made at higher APRs, which would in 
turn trigger certain consumer protections to come into play that are based on ex-
ceeding certain APR levels. However, this problem could have been dealt with by 
raising the existing APR triggers for consumer home loan protections to compen-
sate for the increase in APR that would come with eliminating the exceptions. As 
new data collection projects provide better data on closing costs and APRs, the 
CFPB will be in a better position to perform this reform. 
67 See The Truth, the Whole Truth, and Nothing but the Truth at 188 n.20 (de-
scribing the issue of APR inaccuracy in this situation). 
68  MACRO INT’L, INC., DESIGN AND TESTING OF EFFECTIVE TRUTH IN LENDING
DISCLOSURES 26 (2007), 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/dcca/regulationz/20070523/Execsummary.pdf. 
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related charges),69 thereby allowing savvy creditors to manipulate the 
final APR and finance charge calculations to make a loan look to be 
at a lower price than it really is.70  The CFPB initially proposed 
changes that would eliminate many of these exceptions,71 but these 
changes were not included in the final rule.72
Critics who say the disclosed APR is inaccurate for consum-
ers who pay off a loan early or is unreliable for adjustable-rate loans 
are correct. Because the APR is disclosed at the beginning of a trans-
action, the creditor must make certain assumptions. TILA and Regu-
lation Z require creditors to assume both that the consumer will make 
all scheduled payments on the loan through maturity and that interest 
rates will not change in the future (unless that change is hard-wired 
into the terms of the contract). To do otherwise would require a crys-
tal ball. However, because all creditors are required to make the same 
assumptions, the APR remains standardized and can be compared 
across different loans, assuming one is comparing one or more ad-
justable rate home loans or one or more fixed rate home loans.73 Cur-
rently, a loan calculated as if it would be held by the borrower for the 
entire length of the loan could show a lower APR and still not be the 
lowest-price loan for borrowers who hold the loan for a shorter peri-
od. Interactive Loan Estimates could aim consumers in estimating 
how long they believe they will hold the loan, and APR could then be 
recalculated based on different holding periods that the consumer 
chooses, assuming that the consumer makes a balloon payment for 
the remainder of the loan after they sell the property or refinance the 
loan. In the $277,968 loan used in Experiments 1 and 2 with $19,458 
in fees, for example, the APR calculated as if it were going to be held 
                                                            
69  12 C.F.R. §§ 1026.4(c)–1026.4(f) (2011). 
70 See generally National Consumer Law Center, supra note 56,ch. 3 (describ-
ing calculation of finance charge and exceptions). 
71  Integrated Mortgage Disclosures under the Real Estate Settlement Proce-
dures Act (Regulation X) and the Truth in Lending Act (Regulation Z), 77 Fed. 
Reg. 51,116, 51,143-51,150 (proposed Aug. 23, 2012) (codified at 12 CFR 1024 
and
12 CFR 1026) (describing proposed changes to the finance charge definition).
72  Integrated Mortgage Disclosures under the Real Estate Settlement Proce-
dures Act (Regulation X) and the Truth in Lending Act (Regulation Z), 78 Fed. 
Reg. 79,729, 79,778 (Dec. 31, 2013) (codified at 12 C.F.R. 1024 and 
12 C.F.R. 1026) (describing decision not to adopt changes to finance charge defini-
tion).
73  As will be discussed in Section III of this article, the interactive forms could 
explain the dangers of entering into an adjustable rate loan and how one might be 
better off with a higher fixed-rate loan than a lower adjustable-rate home loan. 
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for 30 years was 3.71%. If it was held for only one year, however, the 
APR would be 10.60%. It would be 4.78%, if held for five years, and 
4.38%, if held for seven years.74 Of note, individuals who have cri-
tiqued reliance on APR, by noting how the APR changes based on 
how long a consumer holds the loan, have failed to propose an alter-
native that is better than the APR for predicting the lower-priced op-
tion when comparing multiple offered home loans. 
The remaining two criticisms—that consumers do not under-
stand what goes into the APR or the difference between the APR and 
the contract interest rate—are problems that theoretically could be 
addressed by disclosure techniques, a possibility we explored in the 
APR Experiments.  Creditors in the Loan Estimate form are required 
to provide a brief description of the APR, such as “the cost of your 
credit as a yearly rate.”75 Although this description is an improve-
ment over the previous required explanation by clarifying it is not the 
interest rate, it fails to simply state that the APR rate is a reflection of 
the overall price of the home loan and that the lower the rate the bet-
ter for the consumer. 
Researchers found consumers have difficulty explaining the 
APR, often confusing it with the contract interest rate for a transac-
tion.  In 1998 the Federal Reserve Board and the U.S. Department of 
Housing and Urban Development jointly commissioned a study, us-
ing the University of Michigan’s Survey Research Center’s Survey of 
Consumers, to learn more about consumers’ understanding of the 
APR: they found that at least 40% of consumers did not understand 
the relationship between the APR and contract interest rates.76  Re-
viewing other studies on the APR, the researchers asserted there was 
“a general consensus in the research community that consumers do 
not seem to understand APRs.”77  Other studies, however, found con-
sumers understand the importance of the APR and its relationship to 
the cost of credit.78  Studies also found consumers use the APR for 
                                                            
74 See infra Appendix [ ]. 
75  12 C.F.R. § 1026.18(e)(2013). 
76  Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban 
Dev., Joint Report to the Congress Concerning Reform to the Truth in Lending Act 
and the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, app. B, at 5-6 (1998),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/rptcongress/tila.pdf.
77  Jinkook Lee & Jeanne M. Hogarth, The Price of Money: Consumers’ Un-
derstanding of APRs and Contract Interest Rates, 18 J. OF PUB. POL’Y &
MARKETING 66, 67 (1999) (surveying literature on consumer comprehension of 
APR). 
78 MACRO INT’L, INC., supra note 63, at 52 (“Most participants [in focus 
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comparison-shopping.79
In 2011, the CFPB commissioned the Kleimann Communica-
tion Group to conduct qualitative research on several versions of pro-
posed mortgage disclosures that included the APR.  Kleimann found 
that most study participants did “not grasp the basics” of the APR and 
often confused it with the interest rate.80  Kleimann also tested four 
different descriptions of the APR: (a) “Annual Percentage Rate  
[__]% expresses interest and costs over 30 years;”81 (b) “Your inter-
est combined with fees over 30 years as a yearly rate;”82 (c) “This is 
not your interest rate.  This rate expresses your costs over 30 
years;”83 and (d) “This is not your interest rate.  This rate expresses 
your costs over the loan term.”84
They only found improvement, however, when using the lat-
ter two, which reduced confusion with the interest rate.85  Intriguing-
ly, one consumer test participant was quoted as saying “I would need 
an explanation on what that APR rate is exactly because I wouldn’t 
know if higher or lower is good or worse. .  .”86  Unfortunately, 
Kleimann does not appear to have pursued that suggestion by testing 
other APR explanations.  Neither Kleimann nor other previous re-
                                                            
groups] understood that the Annual Percentage Rate was associated with the calcu-
lation of their interest charges, and that a lower APR generally corresponded to 
lower charges”). 
79 See Jinkook Lee & Jeanne M. Hogarth, Consumer Information Search for 
Home Mortgages: Who, What, How Much, and What Else?, 9 FIN. SERVICES. REV.
277, 286 (2000) (stating 78% of homeowners who refinanced their homes reported 
comparison shopping based on the APR); Iain Ramsay, Consumer Credit Regula-
tion as ‘The Third Way’? at 12, note 45 (unpublished, undated manuscript on file 
with author)citing Consumer Awareness of Credit Issues – Research Study con-
ducted for the Department of Trade and Industry, THE MARKET AND OPINION
RESEARCH INTERNATIONAL (Sept. 2003) (London: DTI) (last viewed Nov. 5, 2012) 
(UK study finding 83% of those surveyed consider the APR to be the foremost fac-
tor in their mind when considering a loan or credit card—second only to the lend-
er’s reputation). The Iain Ramsay article was unpublished and on file with the au-
thor.
80  KLEIMANN COMMC’NS GRP., INC., KNOW BEFORE YOU OWE: EVOLUTION
OF THE INTEGRATED TILA-RESPA DISCLOSURES 303 (2012), 
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201207_cfpb_report_tila-respa-testing.pdf [here-
inafter Kleimann]. 
81  Kleimann, supra note 79, at B-2. 
82 Id. at D-2 
83 Id. at F-2. 
84 Id. at G-8. 
85 Id. at xxviii, 101, 127, 303. 
86 Id. at 146. 
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searchers appear to have directly tested whether the manner of dis-
closing the APR would affect a consumer’s ability to select the low-
est cost loan even when the consumer could not articulate an explana-
tion of the APR. 
With respect to this consumer comment, we hypothesized 
consumers could, successfully use APR to identify lower cost loans 
— even without understanding the APR — as long as (1) they are 
told that lower values are better for them and (2) the APR is dis-
played in a simple and consumer-friendly format on the first page of 
the Loan Estimate.87 If correct on this hypothesis, then moving the 
APR to make it inconspicuous is a misguided change, since it denies 
consumers a critical tool they need to identify the lowest-priced 
loans.  As discussed in Section III, this change also reduces consum-
ers’ ability to compare an offered loan’s APR to the market-level 
APR that should in fact apply to their credit situation as a means to 
check if the offered loan appears to be overpriced.88 Because of these 
concerns with how the APR is disclosed on the new CFPB Loan Es-
timate form, we conducted two experiments investigating partici-
pants’ abilities to use APR to evaluate loans; Section II reports these 
two experiments. These experiments tested our hypothesis that con-
sumers would be able to use the APR to select the lowest of two of-
fered home loans, if the APR figure were disclosed simply and prom-
inently and described in terms that consumers could understand. 
Section II presents the results of two experiments designed to 
investigate consumers’ abilities to use APR to inform their home-
loan decision-making under various conditions and the results of a fi-
nancial literacy test we gave to participants in the experiments. Sec-
tion III presents policy implications of these findings and describes 
how interactive home-loan disclosure forms can be used to address 
certain key barriers to effective use of the Loan Estimate form by 
consumers in connection with their offered home loan. 
II. THE APR EXPERIMENTS AND FINANCIAL LITERACY TEST
We conducted two experiments to test consumers’ ability to 
use APR to evaluate loan costs. Experiment 1 tested whether con-
sumers would be able to use APR to identify a lower cost loan if the 
APR was displayed simply, prominently, and in a manner that con-
                                                            
87  See attachment reflecting this “Enhanced APR Disclosure” 
88 See Section III infra on creating a link in the Loan Estimate that would al-
low the consumer to see the market level APR based on their credit score and com-
pare that with the APR they are being offered. 
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sumers could understand. The hypothesis was that consumers may 
not need to completely understand APR to use it. We aimed to inves-
tigate what consumers minimally needed to know to use APR effec-
tively. Experiment 2 used eye-tracking technology to test consumers’ 
abilities to find and remember APR, as remembering this number is 
necessary for informed decision-making. 
A. The APR Experiments 
The participants in Experiments 1 and 2 reviewed two loans 
disclosed on the CFPB’s new home-loan disclosure form to deter-
mine which of the two was the lower cost loan. Experiment 1 pre-
sented these disclosures on 8.5” x 11” pieces of paper, which allowed 
participants to easily flip back and forth between the forms to com-
pare the loans. Participants in Experiment 1 did not need to remember 
values to identify the lower cost loan. Experiment 1, therefore, re-
sembles situations wherein consumers have received several loan of-
fers and have the Loan Estimates in front of them to compare. 
Experiment 2 used eye-tracking technology to allow us to in-
vestigate where consumers look on these forms. Consumers in Exper-
iment 2 could not so easily flip back and forth between forms to iden-
tify the lower cost loan and had to rely upon memory to make these 
judgments. Experiment 2, therefore, resembles situations wherein 
consumers only receive one Loan Estimate at a time and need to rely 
upon memory to determine which loan is the lowest cost. 
EXPERIMENT 1 METHODS
DESIGN
This study manipulated how the APR was communicated to 
participants. One format — the “regular” version — was the CFPB’s 
Loan Estimate disclosure form, which only presents the APR on the 
third page. The other format — the “enhanced” version — modified 
the CFPB’s form to more prominently display the APR on the first 
page. The APR was presented within a price-tag icon labeled “APR: 
Price of the Loan” and the clarification “Lower is better for you”.89
Participants reviewed two loans and were randomly assigned to do so 
using either the regular or the enhanced version. The order in which 
the two loans appeared during the study was counterbalanced to con-
                                                            
89  See Figure 1. 
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trol for order effects. 
PARTICIPANTS
A total of 75 participants read through the form, and 67 par-
ticipants completed the entire demographic questionnaire. Of the 75 
participants, 19 were students (eight women, Mage=20.59 years, age 
range: 18 – 27 years), and 56 were members of the local community 
(28 women, Mage=38.7 years, age range: 26 – 59 years) who respond-
ed to an advertisement. Students received course credit while com-
munity members received $20 for participating, and both could earn 
additional money if they correctly preferred and identified the less 
expensive loan option. The demographic data on the participants who 
completed the demographic questionnaire revealed that participants 
were well-educated (M = 15.20 years of formal education for com-
munity participants, SD = 1.96 and M = 13.53 years for students, SD
= 1.42) and spoke English as their primary language (92% of com-
munity participants and 100% of students), but differed in their expe-
rience with home loans (31% of community participants and 0% of 
students). Minority representation was quite high in our sample (53% 
minority among community participants and 35% among students). 
MATERIALS
The CFPB’s loan estimate forms were used to disclose the 
loan terms. The first and second loans were labeled “A” and “B”, re-
spectively. Terms for both loans were spread across six pages, three 
pages per loan. An eight-question survey was located after the final 
page of the second loan estimate. The first two questions asked par-
ticipants, “If you were going to replace your mortgage with a new 
mortgage, which loan would you prefer to take out, A or B?” and 
“Which of these two loans is less expensive overall (i.e., in interest, 
fees, closing costs, and other charges), A or B?” Participants were al-
so asked to explain why they preferred the chosen loan, and how they 
decided which of the two loans was less expensive.90 The remaining 
questions were designed to test participants’ financial literacy. Four 
questions assessed participants’ knowledge of several key loan terms, 
asking them to describe the APR, a balloon payment, a pre-payment 
charge, and the difference between a fixed-rate and adjustable-rate 
                                                            
90  The results of these questions are reported in the Results of Experiment 1 
section below.
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mortgage. The final two questions asked participants to describe 
“problematic loan terms or features that make it more likely that the 
borrower will default in making payments,” and to describe “the ac-
tions a mortgage lender could take against a borrower to recover an 
unpaid loan if the borrower defaulted on making payments.”91
PROCEDURE
All participants were run individually in sessions lasting ap-
proximately 30 minutes.  Prior to beginning, participants were in-
structed to review the terms of two home loans under the assumption 
they already owned a home with a mortgage but would like to replace 
that mortgage with a new one. They were told their task was to de-
cide which of the two loans was a better deal and either loan was a 
viable option for replacing their existing mortgage. The experimenter 
communicated this information to participants and was also located 
on the first page of the packet containing the loan estimates and ques-
tionnaire. Participants were instructed to think about reasons why 
they thought one loan was a better deal than the other while review-
ing the loans and to evaluate the overall cost based on the entire life 
of the loan (30 years). Once participants were briefed and understood 
their role, they started to read through the loan estimates, after which 
they decided which of the two loans they preferred and which loan 
cost less money over the life of loan. Participants then completed the 
questionnaire, as well as the demographic survey, and were paid ac-
cording to the number of correct answers provided. Participants were 
then debriefed and thanked for their time. 
RESULTS OF EXPERIMENT 1
DECISION OUTCOMES
The sample loan estimates were designed so that one loan had 
a slightly lower interest rate than the other (3.125% versus 3.2%) but 
higher loan costs ($19,458 versus $15,180). In this case, the loan with 
the lower interest rate and higher costs had a higher APR of 3.71% 
compared to the loan with the higher interest rate and lower costs that 
had a 3.65% APR. Participants should have identified the loan esti-
mate with the lower APR as lower in cost and preferred it against the 
                                                            
91  The results of these financial literacy questions are presented in Section 
II.B. “Financial Literacy Test Results” below. 
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loan with the higher APR. Results indicated that those who reviewed 
the enhanced forms preferred and correctly identified the lower cost, 
3.65% APR, loan at greater than chance levels (Preference = 2(1) = 
5.16, p = .02, 68% correct; Cost = 2(1) = 8.53, p = .003, 74% cor-
rect). In contrast, those who reviewed the regular forms without the 
APR on the first page preferred and identified the lower cost loan at 
chance levels (Preference = 2(1)= 0.44, p = .50, 44% correct; Cost = 
2(1) = 1.00, p = .31 42% correct). 
We next investigated whether individual differences in formal 
education (years), prior experience with home loans (1 = experience), 
gender (female = 1), and ethnicity (1 = member of minority group) 
influenced the likelihood that the lower APR loan was preferred and 
identified as less expensive. Age was not included in the model be-
cause it was highly correlated with loan experience (r = .54) and 
years of formal education (r  = .26); language was excluded due to 
the low number of participants reporting English as a secondary lan-
guage. The data were split by experimental condition, and a back-
ward stepwise logistic regression was conducted separately for the 
preference and cost questions.  None of the demographic variables 
significantly predicted preference with either version of the form (All 
ps > .05). Years of formal education predicted the likelihood that the 
lower cost loan would be correctly identified with the form contain-
ing the APR on the first page, B = .513, S.E. = .25, Wald’s 2 (1, n = 
34) = 4.334, p = .03, exp(B) = 1.67, as each additional year of educa-
tion increased the odds of identifying the lower cost loan by 67%. 
DECISION EXPLANATIONS
Participants were asked to explain why they preferred Loan A 
to Loan B, or vice-versa, and how they decided which of the two 
loans was less expensive. For each question, we broke these respons-
es into individual comments or thoughts that referenced a particular 
decision criterion. For instance, a response such as, “I chose loan A 
because it had a lower APR and lower total loan costs than loan B” 
contains two decision criteria: the APR and total loan costs. The 
number of participants referencing a particular criterion was then 
added together separately for the preference and cost questions. As 
shown in Table 1a, participants in both conditions most frequently 
cited the interest rate and closing costs when deciding which loan 
they preferred and which loan was less expensive.92  We used Bar-
                                                            
92  As previously noted, the directions provided to the participants in the exper-
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nard’s unconditional test for superiority93 to examine differences in 
the percentage of participants who mentioned the APR with the en-
hanced version relative to the regular version for the Cost and Prefer-
ence questions. A significantly greater percentage cited the APR as a 
decision criterion in deciding which of the two loans was less expen-
sive (Cost = 18.4% vs. 2.7%, p = .03). A marginally greater percent-
age also cited the APR when deciding which loan they would prefer 
to take out if they had reviewed the enhanced version (Preference = 
23.7% vs. 8.1%, p = .06). The two criteria that commonly led partici-
pants to prefer the higher cost loan or fail to identify the lower cost 
loan were the interest rate and the five-year comparison information, 
which displayed the total amount paid in principal, interest, mortgage 
insurance, and loan costs paid after a period of five years94 (see Table 
1b).
                                                            
iment stated that they would be asked questions on the costs of the loan and specif-
ically referenced “interest, fees, closing costs, and other charges” and did not men-
tion the APR. This may explain in part why participants did not reference the APR 
as often as the interest rate and closing costs when deciding which loan they pre-
ferred and which loan was less expensive overall. 
93  Barnard, G.A (1945). “A New Test for 2×2 Tables”. Nature 156 (3954): 
177.
94  The amount paid after five years turned out to be confusing for purposes of 
comparing which of the two loans was lower priced. This is because while the 
amount paid in principal was greater after five years for the higher APR loan, the 
amount remaining to be paid was also higher for the higher APR loan than for the 
lower APR loan. The higher closing costs on the higher APR loan also meant that 
more of the loan amount went towards closing costs with the higher APR loan than 
towards payment of the purchase price of the home, than occurred with the lower 
APR loan. The higher APR loan had a $1,962 higher loan amount and so the 
$4,278 extra in higher fees for the higher APR loan was paid in part by the $1,962 
higher loan amount and also an extra $2,316 of the loan that was spent on closing 
costs rather than going towards the purchase price of the home. Although there was 
a 0.08% difference in interest rate between the two loans, it was not large enough to 
compensate for the $4,278 extra in higher fees for the higher APR loan. The lower 
APR loan reflected more interest paid after 5 years than the higher APR loan be-
cause the interest rate on the lower APR loan was slightly higher than the interest 
rate on the higher APR loan. For example, calculating the total fees, costs, and in-
terest paid, the total amount paid by the borrower after 5 years for the lower APR 
loan would be $57,722 and would be $61,271 for the higher APR loan.  
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EXPERIMENT 2 METHODS
DESIGN
The experimental manipulation and counterbalancing proce-
dures used in Experiment 2 were identical to Experiment 1, except 
the disclosure forms were presented on a computer screen so that 
their eyes could be tracked. 
PARTICIPANTS
The sample consisted of 20 students (16 women, Mage=19.15
years, age range: 18 – 20 years), and 21 members of the local com-
munity (7 women, Mage=39.6 years, age range: 26 – 65 years) who 
responded to an advertisement. Students received course credit while 
community members received $20 for participating, and both could 
earn additional money if they correctly preferred and identified the 
less expensive loan option. Memory for the interest rate, APR, 
monthly payment amount, and total closing costs were also assessed 
and participants received one dollar for each factor they correctly re-
called. Participants were well educated (M = 14.62 years of formal 
education for community participants, SD = 1.97; M = 12.55 years 
for students, SD = 0.69) and spoke English as their primary language 
(95% of community participants and 80% of students) but differed in 
their experience with home loans (38% of community participants 
and 0% of students). Minority representation was quite high in our 
sample (57% minority among community participants and 35% 
among students). All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal 
vision.
MATERIALS
Terms for both loan estimates were spread across twelve 
screens, six screens per loan, so participants first viewed the top-half 
of a page followed by the bottom-half. The pages were divided in 
half to improve textual resolution when participants were reviewing 
each loan, and responses were entered via a keyboard located on the 
table in front of the eye tracker. 
APPARATUS
Eye-movements were recorded monocularly at a sampling 
rate of 1000 Hz using the SR Research EyeLink 1000 infrared eye 
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tracking system with a high degree of spatial accuracy (less than 0.5°
of error). Participants were seated approximately 76 centimeters from 
the computer screen (18 inch Sony Trinitron), where each half-page 
of information was displayed as a digital image at an aspect ratio of 
1,024 x 768 pixels.     
PROCEDURE
All participants were run individually in sessions lasting ap-
proximately 30 minutes. The instructions provided to participants be-
fore reviewing the loan estimates were identical to Experiment 1. 
However, participants in Experiment 2 were also informed that a 
camera would track their eye movements as they read through the 
forms, their ability to recall the exact dollar amounts associated with 
key loan terms would be assessed once they finished reviewing the 
forms, and they would not have access to the form while answering 
these questions. Participants received as much time as needed to 
complete the task. Once participants were briefed and understood 
their role, they learned how to navigate between pages in the form 
with the keyboard by engaging in a practice reading trial. After suc-
cessfully completing this task, participants were given a brief calibra-
tion-validation procedure on the computer screen. They then read 
through the forms, half of a page at a time, presented sequentially. A 
drift correct screen also appeared each time they moved between half 
pages. This drift correct screen required participants to stare at a dot 
and hit a single key. 
After reading through the forms, participants decided which 
of the two loans they preferred and which cost less money over the 
life of loan, and then completed the free recall questions. Finally, par-
ticipants completed the questionnaire used in Experiment 1 and were 
paid according to the number of correct answers provided. The same 
questions that were presented to participants once they had reviewed 
both loan offers in their entirety in Experiment 1 were also presented 
to participants in Experiment 2. However, Experiment 2 also includ-
ed two eye-movement measures as well as a free recall measure, both 
of which are outlined below. 
RESULTS OF EXPERIMENT 2
DECISION OUTCOMES
Unlike the participants in Experiment 1, the participants in 
Experiment 2 could not skip multiple pages with a single keystroke. 
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Each keystroke advanced their position in the form backward or for-
ward by half a page. A drift correct screen also appeared each time a 
move occurred between pages, during which participants stared at a 
dot and hit a single key. These features discouraged participants from 
comparing the loans. Experiment 2 is therefore more similar to situa-
tions where consumers need to identify lower cost loans, but do not 
have all of the disclosure forms for these loans in front of them and 
need to rely upon memory to make decisions. 
Would displaying the APR in the enhanced format on the first 
page of the form aide participants in identifying the lower cost loan 
when they need to rely upon memory? To investigate this question, 
we compared the number of correct responses observed against what 
would be expected by chance separately for both forms using a Chi-
squared test. To calculate this test with an equal number of partici-
pants in each condition, one participant selected at random was ex-
cluded from analysis from the group that did not see the enhanced 
form. Results indicated that the likelihood of preferring or correctly 
identifying the lower cost loan was at or near chance levels when the 
APR was displayed only on page 3 (Preference = 50% correct; Cost = 
50% correct) or on page 1 and 3 (Preference = 2(1) = 0.8, p = .37, 
60% correct; Cost = 2(1) = 0.8, p = .37, 60% correct). These results 
suggest that the advantages of the enhanced APR disclosure help 
primarily when consumers have opportunities to compare loan offers 
side-by-side. When consumers need to rely upon memory, even the 
enhanced APR disclosure will not help. 
DECISION EXPLANATIONS
Decision explanations for Experiment 2 resembled those of 
Experiment 1 and are summarized in Table 2. None of the differences 
in participants’ explanations for their decisions across conditions 
reached significance in Experiment 2 (all ps>.1). When we combine 
Experiments 1 and 2, however, there is a significant relationship be-
tween whether participants received the enhanced APR disclosure 
and whether they justified their decision by citing the APR, 2(1) = 
6.2, p = .01 for the preference question and 2(1) = 4.25, p = .03 for 
the cost question. 
INFORMATION SEARCH
Two eye-movement measures were collected. In particular, 
we examined whether key loan terms were fixated or noted, and the 
total number of times each term was noted (fixation count). For a par-
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ticular term to be integrated into one’s overall evaluation of the loan, 
the dollar amount or rate associated with that term must be viewed. 
The number of fixations landing on a particular element measured the 
relative amount of attention a particular term received, where more 
fixations indicate more attention. If and how frequently participants 
processed key loan terms outlined in both forms was assessed via a 
number of non-overlapping, rectangular Areas of Interest (“AOIs”) 
created around the dollar amounts/rates associated with each (see 
Figure 2 for example). An AOI specifies the areas of a display that 
are under consideration, and only eye-movements (fixations) that 
land on or within these areas are analyzed95 In the present study, a 
fixation was defined as a set of consecutive gaze coordinates located 
within 1° of visual field for a duration of 200ms or greater.96 For a 
term to be considered as noted, the term (for example, 3.2%, $1,661, 
etc.) had to be fixated once for a duration of 200ms or greater. A fixa-
tion count was then calculated by adding the total number of fixations 
landing within the AOI encompassing the dollar amount/rate. 
We did not include one student in this analysis due to a recod-
ing error. We used Barnard’s exact test97 to examine whether the like-
lihood of noting the APR was greater with the enhanced version rela-
tive to the regular version. The percentage of participants noting the 
APR was significantly greater (100% vs. 81%, p = .04) with the en-
hanced version. Stated differently, 19% of participants who viewed 
the regular form failed to fixate this information in either of the loans 
at least once. Fixation count was calculated by adding the number of 
fixations that landed on the APR for those who noted this term. 
Counts that were greater than three standard deviations from the 
mean of all fixation counts (15.44) were not included (n = 1) in this 
analysis. As expected, the APR received significantly more attention 
(i.e., fixations) with the enhanced version, t(33) = 3.505, p = .001, d = 
1.21 (MFix-Count = 18.4 (SD = 8.89) vs. MFix-Count = 9.561 (SD = 5.24). 
FREE RECALL
A total of 38 participants completed the free recall portion of 
the study. We excluded three participants from this analysis due to 
recording errors (n = 1 enhanced, n = 2 normal). Credit was provided 
                                                            
95 See Alex Poole & Linden J. Ball, Eye Tracking in HCI and Usability Research, in 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HUMAN COMPUTER INTERACTION 211, 211-19 (Claude Ghaoui ed., 2006).
96 T. A. Salthouse & C. L. Ellis. Determinants of eye-fixation duration. American Journal of 
Psychology, 93, 207-234. (1980). 
97  Barnard, G.A (1945). “A New Test for 2×2 Tables”. Nature 156 (3954) 
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when the first two digits of the rate (for example, 3 and 1 for the in-
terest rate=3.125%) or dollar amount (for example, 1 and 6 for the 
monthly payment=$1,658) reported matched that outlined in the 
form. The total number of correctly recalled values (0 – 2) was ag-
gregated separately for each participant. A total of 38 participants (n 
= 19 per condition) completed the free recall portion of the study. We 
observed the largest differences in recall between conditions for the 
interest rate and APR. Specifically, when the APR was displayed on 
the first page of the form, 42% (16/38) of recalled APR values were 
correct compared to 26% (10/38). In contrast, 45% (17/38) of re-
called interest rate values were correct when the APR was not dis-
played on the first page compared to 29% (11/39) when the APR was 
disclosed only on page three. Neither difference achieved signifi-
cance (All ps > .10). Recall performance for the monthly payment 
amount (enhanced = 10/38(26.3%), regular = 10/38(26.3%)) and total 
closing cost (enhanced = 9/38(23.6%), regular = 6/38(15.7%)) was 
similar between conditions. 
B. Financial Literacy Test Results
EXPERIMENTS 1 & 2
Responses to the loan attribute description questions, the 
problematic loan terms question, and the lender’s remedies question 
were aggregated across both experiments for ease of interpretation. 
Each of these questions is examined in greater depth below. 
RESULTS OF FINANCIAL LITERACY TEST
LOAN ATTRIBUTE DESCRIPTIONS
Participants were asked to describe the APR, a balloon pay-
ment, a pre-payment penalty, and the difference between a fixed-rate 
and adjustable-rate mortgage. Correct and incorrect responses for 
these questions were also coded as “1” and “0,” respectively. Correct 
responses were those that captured the general features associated 
with a particular loan-attribute (i.e., that the APR takes into account 
virtually all costs of receiving a loan and expresses them as a yearly 
rate, or that payments on a fixed-rate mortgage remain constant over 
the life of the loan while payments for an adjustable-rate mortgage 
can vary). Balloon payment was coded correct if participants men-
tioned it was a large payment due at the end of the loan. Pre-payment 
charge was coded correct if they mentioned that it was a charge for 
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paying off the loan earlier than it was due. By contrast, incorrect re-
sponses were those that bared little resemblance to the actual mean-
ing of the attribute or simply repeated a description contained in the 
form; instances in which no response was provided were also classi-
fied as incorrect. Across both Experiments, 11.2% (13 of 116) of par-
ticipants correctly described the APR98; 12.1% (14 of 116) correctly 
described a balloon payment; 25.0% (29/116) correctly described a 
prepayment charge; and 83.6% (97 of 116) correctly described the 
difference between a fixed and adjustable rate mortgage. The differ-
ences between conditions regarding the percentage of correct re-
sponses for the four questions were insignificant (all ps > .10), indi-
cating that both conditions were equally familiar with these four 
terms. Next, we added the total number of correct responses for each 
participant and then regressed the resulting values on years of formal 
education, experience with home loans (1 = has prior experience with 
home loans), gender (1 = female), and ethnicity (1 = member of mi-
nority group) using a backward elimination method. Prior experience 
with home loans, years of formal education, and gender explained a 
significant proportion of variance in the total number of correct re-
sponses, R2 = .236, F(3,102) = 10.509, p <.001. Both home loan ex-
perience, b = .610, t(102) = 3.398, p = .001, and years of formal edu-
cation, b = .076, t(102) = 2.096, p = .03, were significant predictors 
while gender was a moderately significant predictor, b = -.248, t(102)
= -1.789, p = .07, of the total number of correct answers provided. 
Taken together, these results indicate that participants with prior 
home loan experience and more years of formal education possess 
greater knowledge of home loans, and that men possess moderately 
more knowledge about home loans than women. 
APR
Of the four loan attributes, the lowest percentage of partici-
pants correctly described the APR. The vast majority simply stated 
what the abbreviation “APR” stood for or repeated the definition con-
tained in the form but did not provide a description. However, 
amongst those who provided an incorrect response to this question, 
only 7.7% (8 of 103) stated the APR was the annual interest rate or 
similar to the interest rate. This suggests that the descriptive state-
                                                            
98  Breaking this result down by condition, we found that 12.1% (7/58) of par-
ticipants described the APR correctly in the enhanced APR disclosure condition 
and 10.3% (6/58) did so in the non-enhanced condition. This finding demonstrates 
that consumers can use APR effectively without understanding it. 
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ment on the final page of the form that briefly explains the APR (i.e.,
“your costs over the loan term expressed as a rate. This is not your 
interest rate”) is an effective way to prevent consumers from believ-
ing that the APR and interest rate are one and the same. Nevertheless, 
consistent with previous research these results demonstrate partici-
pants could not define APR and did not know what it represented. 
The participants in Experiment 1 were, nevertheless, able to use APR 
to identify the lower cost loan to a statistically significant amount. 
These results demonstrate consumers do not need to understand APR 
or define it to successfully use it to identify lower cost loans. 
BALLOON PAYMENT.
While most participants understood that a balloon payment 
involved a significant payment of money, few (only 12.1%; 14 of 
116) could explain what this feature meant. The two most common 
misconceptions were that balloon payments were payments that 
gradually increased over time (12.7 %; 13 of 102) (for example, “a 
payment that increases as time passes”) or fees or penalties for failing 
to make monthly mortgage payments on time (5.8%; 6 of 102) (for 
example, “a balloon payment is if you are late making a mortgage 
payment then the bank can raise your interest rate”). 
PREPAYMENT CHARGE.
Relatively more participants could describe a pre-payment 
charge (25.0%; 29 of 116). However, 42.9% (33 of 77) of incorrect 
responses described a pre-payment charge as payment made prior to 
the funding of the loan, similar to a down payment (for example, a 
prepayment charge is like a down payment to assure the lenders of 
your ability to pay the month-to-month payments). 
FIXED VS. ADJUSTABLE RATES.
Most participants correctly described the difference between 
fixed and adjustable-rate mortgages (83.6%; 97 of 116). In fact, when 
we excluded non-responders (n=15), 96% (97 of 101) of responses 
were correct. 
PROBLEMATIC LOAN TERMS
Participants in both experiments were asked to “Describe 
problematic loan terms or features that make it more likely that the 
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borrower will default in making payments.” The key problematic fea-
tures we were looked for were: (i) features that could lead to the loan 
becoming unaffordable, such as adjustable rate features, (ii) terms 
that cause a loan to be unaffordable from the inception of the loan, 
such as high interest rates, fees, and closing costs, and (iii) terms that 
could make it difficult to pay off the loan at its maturity or when the 
borrower needs to move and sell the home, such as an interest only 
loan or loan that otherwise has a large balloon payment due upon re-
payment such as a negative amortization loan, or loans with prepay-
ment charges due upon early repayment of the loan.99 As shown in 
Table 3, the most frequently cited problematic features were loans 
containing an adjustable interest rate or monthly payment, followed 
by loans with balloon payments and high interest rates. The fact that 
more participants cited balloon payments as problematic (n = 18) 
than correctly described this feature (n = 14) may suggest that con-
sumers have a vague sense that balloon payment features are prob-
lematic. Approximately 54% of participants provided at least one cor-
rect response (See Table 3 for grading criteria). Using multiple linear 
regression with backward elimination for a model with years of for-
mal education, gender, and experience with home loans as predictor 
variables, we found that years of education, b = .070, t(104) = 2.041, 
p = .04, and gender, b = -265, t(104) = -1.871, p = .06, R2 = .236, 
F(3,102) = 10.509, p <.001, accounted for a significant proportion of 
variance in the total number of correct responses, R2 = .07, F(2,104)
= 3.944, p =.02. Similar to the loan-attribute description questions, 
men and participants who had more years of formal education cor-
rectly listed more problematic features and terms. 
LENDER REMEDIES QUESTIONS
Participants were also asked in both experiments to describe 
the actions a mortgage lender could take against a borrower to recov-
er an unpaid loan if the borrower defaulted on making payments. The 
                                                            
99  It also occurs to us that borrowers are probably not aware of the fact that 
home loan documents provide that the lender can add to the loan amount due, not 
only the balance of the loan due on the date of the default, but also all accrued in-
terest from the date of the default through the judgment and foreclosure sale and 
the recovery of various expenses the lender incurs to collect on the loan. These 
items can greatly add to the amount due on the loan and ability of the borrower af-
ter a default to be able to exercise their equitable and statutory right of redemption. 
When the Loan Estimate addresses lender remedies it might be helpful to add a link 
with this information.  
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key actions the lender could take to recover the unpaid loan we were 
looking for were: (i) foreclose on the mortgage on the home resulting 
in a loss of title to the home, (ii) a deficiency action against the bor-
rower for the difference between the loan amount due and the amount 
the property sold for at the foreclosure sale (which could lead to a 
garnishment of the borrower’s wages to satisfy this amount over time 
or the imposition of judgment liens on other properties/assets that the 
borrower owns leading to a forced sale of these other proper-
ties/assets to recover the deficiency amount).100 68% of all partici-
pants provided at least one correct answer for this question (see Table 
4 for grading criteria). Approximately 31.8% of participants men-
tioned only foreclosure as an action, 4.3% mentioned only wage gar-
nishment, and 1.7% mentioned only seizure of other properties and 
assets. Of all participants, 14.6% mentioned foreclosure in addition to 
wage garnishment or seizure of other properties and assets. We repli-
cated the regression analyses implemented in the prior two sections 
with the same predictor variables (i.e., gender, years of formal educa-
tion, and home loan experience) and the number of correct remedy 
responses as the outcome variable. However, none of the predictor 
variables remained in the final model (all ps > .10). 
III. POLICY IMPLICATIONS:
Although Dodd-Frank has led to the creation of some useful 
consumer protections,101 the Federal government still relies primarily 
upon home loan disclosures to protect consumers from predatory 
mortgage lending.102 Moreover, while the new Loan Estimate and 
Closing Disclosure forms103 are a vast improvement over the forms 
used prior to 2010,104 we contend that the Loan Estimate should be 
revised and made interactive, as described in this Section.  Doing so 
will likely make the Loan Estimate much more effective in the face 
                                                            
100  Although those were the key remedies we were looking for, we also recog-
nized other answers that were responsive to actions the lender could take that 
would assist them in recovering the loan amount due. 
101  See Section I of this article for a discussion and analysis of these consumer 
protections.
102  See analysis of this point in Section I of this article. 
103  The new Loan Estimate and Closing Disclosure forms that will become ef-
fective on August 1, 2015 are themselves based on revisions to the forms first pro-
posed in 2008, which became effective in 2010. See, RESPA Final Rule, note 34, 
supra
104  See analysis of this point in Section I of this article. 
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of three major challenges confronting consumers: deceptive practices 
in how the disclosures are presented by lenders and mortgage bro-
kers,105 certain demonstrated cognitive barriers to effective use of the 
forms,106 and the low level of financial literacy among consumers.107
We also argue in this Section that the CFPB took a step backward in 
creating the new Loan Estimate form by de-emphasizing the APR 
disclosure, as shown by the results of the APR Experiments we re-
ported upon in Section II.  To address this defect, we propose adopt-
ing the Enhanced APR Disclosure we used in the APR Experiments, 
and supplementing the form with interactive features to address the 
borrower’s likely holding period of the loan. 
The first key reform we recommend108 is to transform the 
Loan Estimate by making it interactive. These interactive features 
could be designed to: (i) better protect consumers from certain com-
                                                            
105  To gain a sense of how mortgage counselors, mortgage brokers, and lend-
ers review home loan disclosure forms with borrowers today, in May 2014 we dis-
tributed a survey to participants at a conference on financial counseling for low-
wealth clients [hereinafter Survey of Financial Counselors] that was sponsored by 
Housing Action Illinois (www.housingactionil.org). The results indicated that, at 
least in Illinois, while face-to-face meetings have declined, many lenders and mort-
gage brokers continue to meet with borrowers in person at the loan application 
stage. Almost half of the responding housing counselors indicated that mortgage 
brokers and lenders tend to do so when presenting the disclosure forms (the remain-
ing indicated that forms are mailed). To get a better sense of the practices of lenders 
and mortgage brokers when they do meet borrowers in person, this survey asked 
these financial counselors what they know about these practices based on what they 
have heard from the borrowers or others. Of the respondents, only nine had experi-
ence counseling borrowers who were considering offered loans (the remaining had 
experience providing general financial literacy or counseling for loans already in 
default). The findings from the Survey of Financial Counselors indicate that mort-
gage lenders and brokers have opportunities through their conversations with con-
sumers to adversely affect the information that consumers glean from home-loan 
disclosure forms. 
106  Stark, D.P., Choplin, J.M., LeBoeuf, M.A., Ineffective in Any Form: How 
Confirmation Biases And Distractions Undermine Improved Home-Loan Disclo-
sures, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 377 (2013); LeBoeuf, M. A., Choplin, J. M., Stark, D. 
P., Don’t remind me: Part set cuing interferes with prospective memory to review 
loan terms on home-loan disclosure forms. (manuscript on file with the authors); 
LeBoeuf, M. A., Choplin, J. M., Stark, D. P., Eye See What You Are Saying: Test-
ing Conversational Influences on the Information Gleaned from Home-Loan Dis-
closure Forms (manuscript on file with the authors). 
107  See the results from the Financial Literacy Test reported on in Section II of 
this article.
108 The reforms we propose should be empirically tested by running experiments 
like those reported in Section II. 
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mon, although deceptive, ways that mortgage brokers and lenders 
present disclosure forms to borrowers, (ii) address some of the 
demonstrated cognitive barriers to effective use of the disclosure 
form, and (iii) provide key additional information geared specifically 
to unsophisticated or sophisticated borrowers for consumers to better 
understand and evaluate the loan being offered to them. 
Based upon a review of case law,109 discussions with former 
mortgage brokers,110 and the results from a survey of home mortgage 
counselors,111 evidence suggests it is common practice for lenders 
and mortgage brokers to do one or more of the following when pre-
senting a home loan disclosure form to a borrower: 
(i) Saying “sign here”112 as they hand the form to the borrow-
er, (typically with a pile of other papers the borrower is asked to 
sign).  This gives the borrower the impression it is not appropriate or 
necessary for the borrower to read the document.  Unscrupulous 
mortgage brokers exacerbate this problem when they give borrowers 
the impression that they are trying to find the borrower the best pos-
sible deal when, in fact, that was not the case. 
(ii) Providing a brief explanation of the form and then say 
“sign here,” again inducing the borrower to believe they should not 
and do not need to read the form before signing it.113
(iii) Engaging in distracting conversation as the borrower at-
tempts to read or skim the form (causing dual tasking, which leads to 
increased confirmation biases and greater inability to recognize a 
                                                            
109 See, e.g., In re First Alliance Mortgage Company v. Lehman Commercial 
Paper, Inc., 477 F.3d 977 (9th Cir. 2006)(see the background discussion that details 
the deceptive lending practices that the lender’s employees engaged in when pre-
senting the disclosure forms to the borrowers in support of their claims for relief 
from these deceptive lending practices). 
110  See Psychological Analysis of Disclosure Laws supra note 28, 30, and ac-
companying text. 
111 See Survey of Financial Counselors supra note 92. 
112  In response to the question in the Survey of Financial Counselors whether 
lenders and mortgage brokers tend to simply say “sign here” or to review the form 
with the borrower, six of the nine reported that mortgage brokers and lenders simp-
ly tell consumers to “sign here” and two reported that they review the form (one did 
not respond). 
113  In response to the question in the Survey of Financial Counselors whether 
mortgage lenders and brokers tend to review only some of the terms, all of the 
terms, or just answer the borrower’s questions, four reported that mortgage lenders 
and brokers tend to review only some of the terms; one reported that they review all 
of the terms explaining that “they read through quickly,” and five reported that they 
tend to just answer the borrower’s questions. 
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problematic loan term).114
(iv) Pointing out the favorable terms in the disclosure form 
and not pointing out the problematic terms (a violation of the 
Grecean norm of conversation).115
(v) Providing either senseless explanations116 when a borrow-
er skims the document and notices a problem or otherwise deceptive 
answers to those questions117 to induce the consumer to proceed with 
the loan notwithstanding the problem they found.118
Furthermore, even when these forms are mailed to consumers, 
the information consumers glean from them could be affected by 
what mortgage brokers or lenders say to the consumer before the 
consumer receives the forms in the mail. 
In addition, due to a lack of financial sophistication, many 
consumers do not even know what they should be looking for as they 
review the disclosure form or where to find that information (exam-
ples of “schema deficits”).119 While the CFPB revised the Loan Esti-
mate form due in part to studies reflecting that consumers rarely un-
derstand what the APR is, we predicted that many consumers do not 
understand other key terms disclosed, nor how those terms could be 
problematic for them. For example, consumers may see on the form 
that the interest rate and monthly payment could increase over the 
term of the loan; however, consumers may not understand this could 
make the loan harder to afford and ultimately cause them to default. 
Consumers may also misunderstand the consequences of de-
faulting on a mortgage. We suspected that most people would be 
                                                            
114 See Psychological Analysis of Disclosure Laws supra note 96.
115  LeBoeuf, M. A., Choplin, J. M., & Stark, D. P. Eye See What You Are Say-
ing: Testing Conversational Influences on the Information Gleaned from Home-
Loan Disclosure Forms (manuscript on file with the authors). 
116  Choplin, J. M., Stark, D.P., Ahmad, J.N., A Psychological Investigation of 
Consumer Vulnerability to Fraud: Legal and Policy Implications, 35 LAW &
PSYCHOL. REV. 61 (2011). 
117  Another tactic is to engage in “argument immunization” where the mort-
gage broker or lender explains away objections that consumers are likely to hear 
later. When consumers later hear strong reasons to object, they will then be less 
likely to accept those reasons. See Psychological Analysis of Disclosure Laws su-
pra note 96, at 102. 
118 Surprisingly, many consumers are vulnerable even to “senseless” explana-
tions of problematic contractual terms—such as written terms that are inconsistent 
with what they had been orally promised).Id.
119 Id. at 98-99 (Sections on “Lack of contractual schemas or knowledge struc-
tures” and “Inaccurate default assumptions of how contractual provisions are likely 
to be structured and if the contract is negotiable.”). 
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aware if they default on a mortgage loan, they could lose their home.  
But we predicted many consumers might not realize this fact, in some 
states, the lender could obtain a deficiency judgment, a court order to 
pay the balance remaining due after the house is sold at a foreclosure 
sale, and then garnish the consumer’s wages or obtain a seizure of the 
borrower’s other property to satisfy the judgment.120
The results from the Financial Literacy Test reflect a far poor-
er level of financial literacy than we predicted. Participants displayed 
a serious level of misunderstanding of a “balloon payment” as only 
12% were able to correctly describe this and many confused this term 
with pre-paid loan closing costs; participants likewise displayed a se-
rious level of misunderstanding of a prepayment charge as only 25% 
correctly describing it. As previously explained, both of these fea-
tures increase the likelihood of default by making it harder for a fi-
nancially distressed borrower to refinance the loan or sell the 
house.121  The inability to understand these terms makes consumers 
far less likely to benefit from their disclosure. When asked to identify 
problematic loan terms or features that make it more likely for a bor-
rower to default, 28.4% did not provide an answer, which we inter-
pret to mean they could not think of any example; of note, 29 of the 
33 answered at least one other financial literacy test question and on-
ly four participants left all of the financial literacy test questions 
blank. Only 30% identified the risks of a variable rate loan;122 16% 
                                                            
120 See Rao, J., Walsh, G., Foreclosing a Dream: State Laws Deprive Home-
owners of Basic Protections, NCLC, Inc. (Feb. 2009), 
http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/foreclosure_mortgage/state_laws/foreclosing-
dream-report.pdf. [hereinafter State Foreclosure Laws](“In 36 States and the Dis-
trict of Columbia mortgage holders pursue so called ‘deficiency judgment’ claims 
against homeowners even after the foreclosed home has been sold at auc-
tion. . .[which] can be pursued without condition in 15 states and the District of Co-
lumbia.”) 
121  It should be noted, however, that even when a borrower is aware of the 
consequences of default that they may still fail to appreciate those consequences 
due to the phenomenon of “temporal discounting” under which consumers fail to 
weight future or uncertain costs in proportion to current or certain costs; Stevenson, 
M.K., Decision Making With Long-Term Consequences: Temporal Discounting for 
Single and Multiple Outcomes in the Future, 122 J. OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.:
GENERAL 3, 3–22 (1993); Chapman, G.B., Temporal Discounting and Utility for 
Health and Money, 22 J. OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: LEARNING, MEMORY, AND 
COGNITION 771, 771–791 (1996). 
122  Adjustable rate loans are riskier than fixed rate loans because the interest 
rate can rise to a level that the borrower cannot afford to pay and the borrower 
might not be able to take out a new loan to pay off the adjustable rate loan at a rate 
they can afford. See Final Rule Summary supra note 36, at 3. 
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identified the risks when a loan has a balloon payment;123 14% identi-
fied high interest rates;124 and 4% identified expensive monthly pay-
ments.125
When asked to list all of the actions the lender could take to 
recover the unpaid loan amount after the borrower defaults, 21% did 
not provide an answer, which we interpreted to mean that they could 
not think of an example, and 23% vaguely stated “sue/take legal ac-
tions.” Approximately 52% of participants mentioned at least one of 
the following actions: foreclosure, wage garnishment, or seizure of 
other properties and assets: 31.8% mentioned only foreclosure; 4.3 % 
mentioned only wage garnishment; and 1.7 % mentioned only seizure 
of other properties and assets. Of all the participants, only 14.6% 
mentioned foreclosure in addition to wage garnishment or seizure of 
other properties and assets. This surprisingly high level of non-
awareness of the major consequences of default makes borrowers 
even more prone to miscalculating the costs-benefits of risky loan 
                                                            
123  With a balloon payment, at the time of maturity or early repayment of the 
loan, the borrower may owe a substantial amount of money, perhaps the entire orig-
inal amount borrowed, and will need to obtain a new loan (or sell the property) to 
pay off the balance due on the prior loan. With a fully amortizing loan with no bal-
loon payment, when the loan matures there is no additional payment to make, just 
the last monthly installment of interest/principal. Loans with balloon payments are 
riskier because the borrower might have trouble obtaining a new loan to pay off the 
balloon payment if the borrower’s creditworthiness has decreased, the property 
value has decreased, or the underwriting standards have become stricter. Also, in-
terest rates may have gone up and the borrower will now have to take out a loan to 
pay the balloon payment at a higher interest rate than they were paying under the 
prior loan (which may make the loan less affordable too). Borrowers with interest-
only loans (which have balloon payments of the entire principal due at maturity) 
face a heightened risk of these problems, in particular, decreases in property value.  
Interest-only loans make the borrower more like a renter than an owner unless the 
property increases in value. 
124  Even if affordable, a loan with a high interest rate might in fact be predato-
ry in nature when the borrower could have obtained a loan at a lower interest rate 
based on their credit score, loan to value ratio, and source of income. Borrowers 
should be made aware of this risk and needless loss of substantial money over sev-
eral years under a loan. For example, a borrower will spend an extra $14,690.47 
when they take out a $300,000 loan at 3.25% rather than 3.00% and pay off the 
loan at maturity, and will pay an extra $5,039.28 seven years after taking out the 
loan if they sell the home or refinance the loan at that time. 
125  Of course a high interest rate will lead to high monthly payments that in 
turn will make the loan less affordable and make it more likely for the borrower to 
default.
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features or products, such as adjustable rate loans.126 Another conse-
quence of this lack of financial sophistication is that many borrowers 
are likely to, at best, merely skim over the disclosure document rather 
than read it carefully.  This could lead to greater confirmation biases 
(a circumstance in which consumers look for evidence that confirms 
positive statements the lender or broker made about the loan rather 
than looking for details suggesting what they were might be untrue). 
Thus, the lack of necessary background financial education 
can have a profound negative impact on the effectiveness of disclo-
sure forms as a means to help borrowers make wise home loan deci-
sions. While financial education in high school or at some other point 
before a borrower applies for a home loan can help,127 there is no re-
quirement for such education in order to take out a typical home 
loan.128 In addition, even if a borrower received this type of education 
in the past, they may have forgotten much of what they learned,129
and testing reflects that people learn most effectively when they are 
learning about something they are about to use.130
To try to address these three problems, we propose testing 
how creating and adding to the Loan Estimate form certain interac-
tive features might aid comprehension. The interactive features we 
propose testing could include warning lights—red and yellow—that 
highlight potentially problematic loan terms along with internet links 
                                                            
126  Even when a consumer understands how adjustable rate loans could cause 
a default in the future, the phenomenon of “temporal discounting” can cause the 
consumer to under value this risk; M. K. Stevenson, Decision Making With Long-
Term Consequences: Temporal Discounting for Single and Multiple Outcomes in 
the Future, 122 J. OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: GENERAL 3, 3–22 (1993); G. B. 
Chapman, Temporal Discounting and Utility for Health and Money, 22 J. OF
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: LEARNING, MEMORY, AND COGNITION 771, 771–791 
(1996). 
127  While there are numerous financial educational resources available to con-
sumers from governmental websites, it does not appear that many consumers are 
aware of them and use them.
128  Borrowers obtaining loans defined as “high-cost” by the Home Ownership 
and Equity Protection Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 1602(bb), 1639) are required to obtain 
housing counseling before the loan closing.  Loans of this type are currently rela-
tively rare (2,185 made in 2012). See Consumer Financial Protection Bureau web-
site, http://www.consumerfinance.gov/hmda/explore.
129  Dunlosky, J., Rawson, K.A., Marsh, E.J., Nathan, M.J., Willingham, D.T., 
Improving Students’ Learning with Effective Learning Techniques: Promising Di-
rections From Cognitive and Educational Psychology, 14 PSYCHOL. SCI. IN THE 
PUB. INT. 4, 4-58 (2013). 
130  Weintraub, R. S., & Martineau, J. W., The Just-in-Time Imperative, 56
TRAINING & DEV. J. 51, 51-57 (2002). 
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providing more details customized to the specific borrower.  Elec-
tronic versions of the Loan Estimate could have flashing warning 
lights and live hyperlinks.  The links could take the borrower to a 
website providing a personalized evaluation tool that could enable the 
borrower to determine whether the highlighted loan terms were ap-
propriate or unduly risky given the borrower’s situation.  The differ-
ence between the red and yellow lights would indicate the risk of de-
fault posed by the highlighted term, possibly based on historical data, 
and the likelihood the loan term is unsuitable for the borrower. The 
effectiveness of these potential reforms should be tested in future ex-
periments like those reported in Section II. 
The website could also provide plain-English explanations of 
the loan terms, in particular, problematic terms, and information 
about how to shop for loans without those problematic terms.  The 
borrower could be required to click on and navigate through the links 
associated with the warnings, and perhaps also keep certain screens 
of information open, before the borrower could proceed with the 
loan.  Experiments like those reported in Section II should test 
whether requiring borrowers to do so increases the amount of atten-
tion borrowers give the disclosures and thereby reduces the practice 
of borrowers simply signing without looking or just skimming the 
disclosures.  The rules for disclosures could be revised to require that 
if the borrower does not click on the mandatory links in the Loan Es-
timate, and navigate through them, they will not be able to sign the 
Loan Estimate. In that case, the lender would not be allowed to fur-
ther process the borrower’s loan application. Future experiments 
should also test whether the highlighted links would help unsophisti-
cated borrowers know where to look on the disclosure form, as these 
links would point out to them problematic terms in their offered loan 
and provide them more personalized and impartial guidance on the 
suitability of those terms.  The interactive features can act as a good 
mortgage counselor or attorney would for the borrower, pointing out 
and explaining problematic features of the loan they are considering. 
One problem is borrowers who do not have easy access to a 
computer to utilize the interactive Loan Estimate, or who are not ade-
quately computer literate to feel comfortable navigating the interac-
tive features. We recommend mortgage counselors be trained to use 
the interactive features and to help those borrowers who are not com-
fortable navigating those features on their own, including consumers 
who do not have access to a computer. We estimate it should take on 
average approximately thirty minutes for the typical consumer to 
click and navigate through the required links, although this would 
need to be empirically confirmed. Thus, the charge to perform this 
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service should be low, and could be regulated to be provided at a low 
rate, such as $50-$75. Due to the large number of people who have 
entered into overpriced loans in the past, we believe the added cost 
for this service to the consumer, a fraction of what they pay for ex-
ample for the required appraisal, is far outweighed by the benefits the 
consumer will receive from the service in detecting, among other 
things, when the closing costs they are being charged appear over-
priced and how to negotiate or shop around for a lower cost loan. 
However, we are mindful this could lead to borrowers who are elder-
ly, poor, or have limited access to computers, most likely to incur this 
charge. We therefore propose several ideas to address that undesira-
ble outcome. First, shift the cost of this service to lenders or mortgage 
brokers since their common practice of telling consumers to “sign 
here,” rather than encourage them to carefully read the form, and oth-
er deceptive practices noted earlier, is one of the key reasons interac-
tive Loan Estimate forms are necessary. Lenders could then be pro-
hibited from charging this as an added loan charge or service to the 
borrower. Alternatively, if the lending community objects to absorb-
ing this cost, and successfully blocks it, is to design the interactive 
Loan Estimate so it can be viewed on smart phones, thereby increas-
ing access, with paper forms printed in color, and the interactive sys-
tem designed to be done via voice on a traditional phone as well. In 
addition, private practice lawyers acting pro bono, free legal services 
organizations, and law school clinics could be encouraged to receive 
training on the use of the interactive features and provide free help to 
lower income and elderly borrowers who do not have access to a 
computer or otherwise might have difficulty navigating the interac-
tive features on their own.131
The following are examples of how adding interactive fea-
tures to the CFPB’s Loan Estimate form could aid consumer under-
standing and decision-making. All of these proposals should be tested 
in future experiments before they are implemented and further details 
would need to be fleshed out to implement these interactive features. 
                                                            
131  Indeed, the results in Section II for the eye-tracking experiment suggest 
that when the consumer is comparing two different loans on two different Loan Es-
timate forms and relying upon memory (versus being able to compare the disclo-
sures side by side with printed out versions), it is difficult for the consumer to 
choose the lower priced home loan. Consequently, enabling the consumer to have 
the key relevant data from the two loans on one piece of paper or computer screen 
may be necessary for them to most effectively price compare using the Loan Esti-
mate form. This should also be empirically tested. 
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1. We recommend the Loan Estimate form be programed so 
that it would flash yellow over the APR figure in the form if the APR 
for the offered loan is higher than the national average APR offered 
to borrowers with the same credit score on that date. Currently, one 
can log onto www.myfico.com for free to input a credit score and then 
determine the APR is nationwide associated with that credit score on 
that day. A similar process could be used by the CFPB with this in-
teractive feature.  Although currently a borrower could do this type of 
check on their own for free by using www.myfico.com, assuming they 
already know their credit score, few borrowers seem aware of this 
possibility and how to use it, as reflected by the fact that in the past a 
tremendous percentage of consumers have taken out overpriced home 
loans (i.e., loans at a higher price than which they would have quali-
fied). The lender could be required to disclose in the Loan Estimate 
the average of the three borrower’s credit scores that the lender typi-
cally obtains through its credit check of the borrower.  The form 
would flash yellow over the Enhanced APR Disclosure on page 1 of 
the Loan Estimate if the APR disclosed is greater than the APR figure 
that borrowers with this credit score are currently getting in the mar-
ketplace. As previously noted, there are no current protections under 
Federal law to prevent the borrower from taking out an overpriced 
home loan. Thus, this added disclosure is very important. The flash-
ing yellow link can state something such as, “It appears you may be 
paying too much for this Loan! Click here to see the APR price that 
borrowers with your credit score are getting.” The borrower could 
then receive in the link information and explanations on the elements 
that lenders focus on to determine the price for the loan that they 
charge to different borrowers: the borrower’s creditworthiness as re-
flected by their credit score, the loan to value ratio, the debt to service 
ratio, the source of the borrower’s income, and length of employ-
ment. The link could emphasize that the consumer should shop 
around to obtain other APR quotes from other lenders to make sure 
they are not being overcharged, with some tips on how to do that, and 
could provide an example of how a difference of only .25% can lead 
to thousands of dollars of added payments under the loan. If the of-
fered loan contains an APR figure that is equal to or less than the 
market APR for borrowers with that credit score, then there will not 
be a flashing yellow over the link and no requirement to click on that 
link in order to be able to sign the Loan Estimate form. 
2. We recommend testing whether the five year comparisons 
currently on page three of the Loan Estimate, which attempts to show 
the cost of the disclosed loan over a five-year period to enable price 
comparisons that assume a five year holding period, should be re-
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placed with the following more tailored disclosure and link. The dis-
closure could read: 
“The APR reflected on page 1 of the Loan Estimate assumes 
you will not pay off the loan early (for example, by refinancing or 
selling your house). If you know that you will pay off the loan early, 
you may want to click on the link below to see whether that will 
change the APR on this loan.  Over the last five years, homeowners 
have typically paid off their mortgages after [insert number] years.  
But you should make a decision based on your own personal situa-
tion. Shopping for more than one loan and comparing the APRs can 
help you save money.”
Future research should investigate whether this approach is 
suitable for less sophisticated consumers, or only suitable for more 
sophisticated consumers, as it requires the borrower to predict events 
that will be years in the future (i.e., events and economic conditions 
that affect whether the borrower will pay off the loan early). In addi-
tion, the concept that the APR will change depending upon the length 
of time the consumer holds the loan may be too difficult a concept for 
unsophisticated consumers to understand. We wish to empirically test 
how well consumers do with this highly sophisticated analysis before 
we recommend whether it should be a mandatory link or an optional 
one.  We assume more sophisticated borrowers will choose to per-
form this analysis. Once they click on this link, the link can pose 
questions for the borrower relating to their life circumstances that 
will help them gauge the timeline of moving from the home and also 
help them gauge the timeline of a likely refinance (for example, if 
they think their credit score is likely to go up in the near future allow-
ing them a lower APR or if interest rates appear to be coming down 
over the next few years). 
3. We recommend testing whether flashing yellow or red 
lights over potentially or clearly problematic loan features would im-
prove the chances that attention might be drawn to these features. 
That is, for each of the “Loan Terms” listed on page one of the 
CFPB’s Loan Estimate form, which discloses whether the loan 
amount can increase, whether the interest rate or monthly payment 
can increase and whether the offered loan contains a prepayment 
charge or balloon payment, if the offered loan contains any of these 
potentially or clearly problematic features (i.e., “Yes” is marked on 
the form), a yellow or red light could flash over the “Yes” disclosure. 
These lights could have links that borrowers could be required to 
click onto and navigate through in order to be able to proceed with 
the loan process. The links should then include easy-to-understand 
explanations of these features and why they may be, or are, problem-
Stark Article (final).docx (Do Not Delete) 1/7/15 8:08 PM
138 Loyola Consumer Law Review Vol. 27:1 
atic. As noted earlier, the vast majority of participants in the Finan-
cial Literacy Test reflected a lack of understanding of what is meant 
by the terms prepayment charge and balloon payment, yet these terms 
and features increase the risk of default. These changes may help bor-
rowers avoid these terms and facilitate shopping around for loans 
without these features. 
4. We recommend testing whether adding the sentence “This
loan meets the definition of a ‘Qualifying Mortgage” to the Loan 
Terms listed on page one of the CFPB’s Loan Estimate form im-
proves home loan decision-making. If the loan does meet the defini-
tion indicated by a “Yes” after this sentence on the form, then there 
would be no mandatory link. If the answer is “No,” however, then 
there would be a mandatory link with a flashing red light. The link 
could explain in plain English the standards established to be a Quali-
fying Mortgage, an attempt under Dodd-Frank to create a modicum 
of protection from problematic loan terms, and why certain features 
are considered unsafe or otherwise unfair. For borrowers interested in 
learning more even when the link is not mandatory, the link could 
caution that a loan could be a Qualifying Mortgage and still be over-
priced since the cap on interest rates and fees are set at a high level. 
In responding to the concern that there are exemptions to the Qualify-
ing Mortgage requirement for certain smaller banks, the directions on 
filling in this disclosure could clarify to the lender and its agents that 
they still must indicate “No” here for exempt lenders since the focus 
is on the features of the loan not the source of the loan. 
5.  We recommend testing the effectiveness of adding a link 
for each of the Categories A-C of the closing costs detailed on page 
two of the Loan Estimate. The link could provide the median total 
closing costs for each of those categories for the State and County 
that applies to the mortgaged property. These links would not be 
mandatory to click on and navigate through unless the total median 
costs for the applicable category has been exceeded, in which case 
the category link will flash in red. The link could then explain that the 
costs reflected in the category for the offered loan exceed the typical 
costs charged and provide information on how to seek a reduction to 
those charges with the lender and/or how to shop around for a loan 
with lower closing costs. While we did not test for experiment partic-
ipants’ knowledge of median closing costs figures, we believe we 
safely assume that borrowers are typically not aware of this infor-
mation and hypothesize that having it disclosed in this fashion could 
be very useful to them in analyzing whether the loan is overpriced. 
For example, while the APR figures in the APR Experiments were 
quite low in light of historical APRs, we note that the category A loan 
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charges for both of the loans we used struck us as high and assume 
that if the borrower shopped around they could have received a loan 
with lower Category A charges. 
7. We also recommend testing a number of possible changes 
to page three of the Loan Estimate form, just before the signature 
line, to the category called “Other Considerations” which contains 
some very helpful information for borrowers and goes beyond dis-
closing the costs of the loan, but which borrowers may not be notic-
ing or understanding: 
First, the language under “Appraisal” states: “We will 
promptly give you a copy of any appraisal, even if your loan does not 
close.” This statement contains very helpful information, but we 
wonder how many borrowers will notice it especially since it is on 
the last page of the Loan Estimate. Second, under “Loan Acceptance” 
the final version of the Loan Estimate form states: “You do not have 
to accept this loan because you have received this form or signed a 
loan application.” This is also very helpful information that may em-
power consumers to reject a bad loan offer, but also appears on page 
three of the Loan Estimate. To improve the likelihood that consumers 
notice these portions of the Loan Estimate form, testing should be 
done on the impact of underlining or otherwise highlighting those 
words. We also recommend that an additional sentence be added in 
light of the interactive warning system we have recommended: “If
any portion of this Loan Estimate form has appeared with a yellow or 
red flashing light, this is an indication that the highlighted term is po-
tentially problematic (yellow) or is problematic (red) by being an 
overpriced or non-standard charge or is a loan term that increases 
your risk of defaulting under the loan.” Indeed, it may make sense to 
instead provide this kind of warning and explanation in a set of direc-
tions to the Loan Estimate form that the CFPB could create to ac-
company the interactive Loan Estimate form to alert the borrower up 
front as to the meaning of the yellow and red lights and to save space 
on page three of the form. 
Also, we found the language explaining, “Refinance” and 
“Liability after Foreclosure” to be not as helpful as they could be. 
Currently, “Refinance” reads: “Refinancing this loan will depend on 
your future financial situation, the property value, and market condi-
tions. You may not be able to refinance this loan” [emphasis added]. 
This is a very important point and counters what many mortgage bro-
kers and lenders reportedly have told borrowers to reassure them to 
enter into loans with potentially problematic features such as adjusta-
ble interest rates. But some consumers might misconstrue the itali-
cized language to mean there is a prohibition on paying off the loan 
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early. This ambiguity should be clarified by saying instead something 
such as: “While you have the right to pay off this loan early, you may 
have trouble obtaining a new loan to pay off this loan, or the new 
loan may have the same or even less favorable features. So be sure 
you are comfortable with the features of this loan, and if you are not, 
shop around for a loan with better features and terms.”
Finally, the description of “Liability after Foreclosure” ap-
pears to refer to changes in state law where the mortgaged property is 
located that may have expanded lenders’ rights upon borrower de-
fault that would apply to future home loans. We believe the more im-
portant point that should be noted in the Loan Estimate, especially in 
light of the results from our Financial Literacy Test, is that if the bor-
rower defaults, the borrower can lose more than their home; that in 
some states the lender can also seek to recover the debt due with a 
wage garnishment, where the lender will receive a portion of the bor-
rower’s paycheck each pay period until the entire debt is paid in full, 
or obtain a judgment lien on other real or personal property the bor-
rower owns and sell those properties too in order to collect the full 
amount due. This general information could be noted either briefly on 
the form with a link providing details or, even better, if the CFPB can 
keep track of the relevant state laws, the form could flash yellow over 
the term “Liability after Foreclosure” when the state where the mort-
gaged property is located does not include anti-deficiency laws that 
prohibit this from occurring.132 This information is important to en-
sure borrowers can better understand and weigh the negative conse-
quences of taking out a home loan with risky features. However, de-
termining whether supplying this information in fact serves that 
purpose, notwithstanding temporal discounting, sunk costs, and the 
“endowment effect,”133 should be empirically tested. The link could 
also explain how the loan amount due just prior to the loan default 
can be increased to include interest that has accrued on the debt, the 
lender’s out of pocket payment of real estate taxes and property in-
                                                            
132 See State Foreclosure Laws, supra note 106.
133  Temporal discounting and sunk costs have been previously explained in 
this article. For the Endowment effect, see Kahneman, Daniel et al., Experimental
Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem, 98 J. POLIT. ECON. 1325, 
1326-29 (1990) (Under the endowment effect, borrowers making an original pur-
chase may feel as if they own the house prior to closing after imagining their pos-
sessions in the house and their children sleeping in the bedrooms. They might then 
so value the home that they are more likely to proceed with an overpriced loan or 
one with other problematic features due to their fear of losing their ability to close 
on the house purchase.)
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surance, and certain other out-of pocket expenses the lender may in-
cur in maintaining the mortgaged property after the loan default.  We 
assume most consumers are not aware of this unless they have al-
ready experienced a loan in default, yet it is important information 
since it shows how the amount owed that the borrower could be per-
sonally responsible for can rise dramatically beyond the unpaid loan 
amount at the time of the default. 
We wish to emphasize these are only preliminary thoughts on 
how the Loan Estimate form could be made much more effective and 
responsive to the problems noted through the creation of an interac-
tive form. It is essential that consumer testing take place on any pro-
posed interactive features to determine if they in fact lead to better 
consumer decision making by addressing the various barriers to ef-
fective use of the Loan Estimate previously described. The first two 
authors plan to develop experiments to test the impact of various 
types of interactive features to identify best practices for improved 
home loan decision making by consumers. 
The second key category of reform we propose is revising the 
Loan Estimate form to include the Enhanced APR Disclosure we 
used in the APR Experiments, supplemented by the interactive fea-
tures noted earlier. As detailed in Section II, while experiment partic-
ipants using the new CFPB Loan Estimate form134 were able to iden-
tify the lower cost home loan at only chance level (44%), participants 
using the Loan Estimate form with the “Enhanced APR Disclosure” 
were able to identify the lower cost home loan 77% of the time. 
In addition, the APR is the single piece of information that 
provides a good sense of the overall price of a home loan. Because 
the Loan Estimate discloses many different components of the price 
of a home loan, many consumers are likely to experience “infor-
mation overload”135 as they review the form and revert to “reason 
based decision making”136 (where the consumer focuses on only one 
factor for making a decision). We believe that as revised in the fash-
                                                            
134  The Loan Estimate form we used in our experiments was based on the form 
as proposed by the CFPB at the time we conducted our experiments. Although the 
CFPB made some edits to the final version of the form from its proposed version, 
those edits were minor and did not relate to what was being examined in the APR 
Experiment. 
135  Lussier, D.A., Olshavsky, R.W., Task Complexity and Contingent Pro-
cessing in Brand Choice, 6 J. OF CONSUMER RES., 1979, at 154, 154–165
136  Shafir, E., Simonson, I., Tversky, A., Reason-Based Choice, 49 COGNITION
11, 11–36 (1993); Willis, L.E., Decision-Making and the Limits of Disclosure: The 
Problem of Predatory Lending, 65 MD. L. REV., 2006, at 707, 780–81. 
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ion we propose (including the interactive features we propose), the 
APR is the best single factor for consumers to use if they revert to 
that type of single factor based decision-making due to information 
overload.  The APR can also serve as the basis for consumers to de-
termine if offered loans are overpriced or at the market rate in light of 
the borrower’s credit score as previously explained. 
But in order to use the APR effectively, the borrower must 
first notice and fixate on it. Unfortunately, 19% of participants who 
received the regular Loan Estimate form did not look at the APR, 
while all of the participants who received the Enhanced APR Disclo-
sure looked at it. Furthermore, of those who did look at the APR, 
those who received the Enhanced APR Disclosure looked at it twice 
as often as those who received the current CFPB Loan Estimate Dis-
closure form. While it is true that there are some limitations in com-
pletely relying upon APR as currently calculated,137 the most serious 
limitation, the impact of an early payoff on the ultimate accuracy of 
the disclosed APR figure, can be addressed through interactive fea-
tures previously described. 
Consequently, we conclude that relegating the APR to page 
three of the Loan Estimate form in an inconspicuous fashion is not 
sound policy since it incorrectly signals to consumers that APR is not 
important information on which to focus. We therefore recommend 
the CFPB revise the Loan Estimate to reflect the Enhanced APR Dis-
closure we used in our APR Experiments, as supplemented with in-
teractive features that enable the borrower to also receive a revised 
APR figure based on the borrower’s estimated period of holding the 
loan.
Before concluding this policy analysis, it is worthwhile to 
briefly address the legal question as to the CFPB’s authority to make 
the kind of changes to the Loan Estimate that we have proposed. 
Congress gave the CFPB broad authority to implement the disclosure 
requirements of TILA. Section 1032(f) of Dodd-Frank specifically 
directs the CFPB to publish integrated mortgage disclosure forms, 
which they did with the Loan Estimate and Closing Disclosure forms. 
Because the Enhanced APR disclosure we proposed to the Loan Es-
timate form is a smaller change than moving the APR to the third 
page as the CFPB did, it is clear the CFPB has the authority to make 
our recommended and empirically tested change to the Loan Esti-
mate. Furthermore, because the interactive features we propose for 
the APR would not distract from the mandatory disclosures and are 
                                                            
137  Those limitations are discussed and responded to in Section 1. 
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intended to educate consumers,138 there is also no question that the 
CFPB has authority to add the interactive features that we propose. 
The CFPB also clearly has authority to implement the other interac-
tive features to the Loan Estimate form we have recommended they 
consider and test, in light of the CFPB’s general rulemaking authority 
under TILA Section 105(a), 15 U.S.C. 1604(a), and the fact that the 
interactive changes are designed to further the purposes of TILA. 
Section 105(a) authorizes the CFPB to prescribe regulations that con-
tain “additional requirements” that the Bureau finds are necessary or 
proper to effectuate the purposes of TILA.139 One of the purposes of 
TILA is “to assure a meaningful disclosure of credit terms so that the 
consumer will be able to compare more readily the various credit 
terms available to him and avoid the uninformed use of credit.”140
The interactive features we propose the CFPB to consider and test are 
intended to promote those purposes. In addition, we are hopeful the 
proposed interactive features will lead to fewer consumers heeding 
the typical mortgage lender or broker’s direction to “sign here” and 
                                                            
138  The Dodd-Frank Act also required the Bureau to establish an Office of Fi-
nancial Education to improve the financial literacy of consumers. 
139 We agree with the CFPB’s description of its rule making authority in their 
proposed regulations to the integrated disclosure rules: “As amended by the Dodd-
Frank Act, TILA section 105(a), 15 U.S.C. 1604(a), directs the Bureau to prescribe 
regulations to carry out the purposes of TILA, and provides that such regulations 
may contain additional requirements, classifications, differentiations, or other pro-
visions, and may provide for such adjustments and exceptions for all or any class of 
transactions, that the Bureau judges are necessary or proper to effectuate the pur-
poses of TILA, to prevent circumvention or evasion thereof, or to facilitate compli-
ance. A purpose of TILA is “to assure a meaningful disclosure of credit terms so 
that the consumer will be able to compare more readily the various credit terms 
available to him and avoid the uninformed use of credit. TILA section 102(a); 15
U.S.C. 1601(a). . . Historically, TILA section 105(a) has served as a broad source 
of authority for rules that promote the informed use of credit through required dis-
closures and substantive regulation of certain practices. However, Dodd-Frank Act 
section 1100A clarified the Bureau’s section 105(a) authority by amending that sec-
tion to provide express authority to prescribe regulations that contain ‘additional 
requirements’ that the Bureau finds are necessary or proper to effectuate the pur-
poses of TILA, to prevent circumvention or evasion thereof, or to facilitate compli-
ance. This amendment clarified the authority to exercise TILA section 105(a) to 
prescribe requirements beyond those specifically listed in the statute that meet the 
standards outlined in section 105(a). . .” Integrated Mortgage Disclosures Under the 
Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (Regulation X) and the Truth In Lending 
Act (Regulation Z), 77 Fed. Reg. 51,116 (codified at 12 CFR 1024 and12 CFR 
1026 ) ( 2012)). 
140 TILA § 102(a); 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a).
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not carefully read the disclosure form, thus negating the entire pur-
pose of the disclosure form. Requiring an interactive version of the 
Loan Estimate which makes that result far less likely is thus con-
sistent with the Congressional directive to the CFPB to prescribe 
rules to prevent “circumvention or evasion”141 of TILA. 
III. CONCLUSION
This article focused on addressing the primary reasons why 
home loan disclosures fail to empower many borrowers to make wise 
home loan decisions, such as: (i) the complexity of decision-making 
on home loan products, (ii) the common harmful practices of mort-
gage brokers and lenders when presenting the disclosure forms (in-
cluding saying “sign here” before the consumer has had a chance to 
carefully read or even skim the disclosure form), (iii) high levels of 
financial illiteracy among consumers, and (iv) cognitive limitations 
among consumers. We believe revising the Loan Estimate form to 
make it interactive in the general fashion we proposed is necessary to 
attempt to address these barriers to effective use of the form. We 
therefore urge the CFPB to test and consider adopting the creation of 
an interactive Loan Estimate form and to incorporate into that form 
the Enhanced APR Disclosure that performed so well in our APR 
Experiments. By taking advantage of technology that will enable the 
creation of interactive disclosure forms, and by empirically testing 
and refining these forms, the Dodd-Frank legislation promoting con-
sumer home loan protection can be upgraded to a much needed, high-
er functioning “Version 2.0.” 
Figure 1. Top half of page 1 with the APR (top panel) and without 
the APR (bottom panel). 
                                                            
141 See supra note 125.
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Table 1a: Number and percentage of participants who cited a particu-
lar loan attribute when responding to the Preference question (“If you 
were going to replace your mortgage with a new mortgage, which 
loan would you prefer to take out? Why?”) and Cost question 
(“Which of these two loans is less expensive overall? And how did 
you decide which of the loans was less expensive?”) in Experiment 1. 
 ENHANCED REGULAR
PREFERENCE COST PREFERENCE COST
N PARTICIPANTS (%) N % N % N % N % 
APR 9 23.7 7 18.4 3 8.1 1 2.7 
Closing costs 9 23.7 12 31.6 11 29.7 14 37.8 
Interest rate 11 28.9 10 26.3 16 43.2 14 37.8 
Fees 5 13.2 10 26.3 5 13.5 8 21.6 
5 year comparison 6 15.8 5 13.2 8 21.6 4 10.8 
Monthly Payment 4 10.5 5 13.2 3 8.1 7 18.9 
Loan Amount 1 2.6 1 2.6 2 5.4 1 2.7 
Total interest % 1 2.6 0 0.0 3 8.1 5 13.5 
Total Loan Cost 0 0.0 3 7.9 0 0.0 2 5.4 
Not Classifiable 6 15.8 7 18.4 7 18.9 5 13.5 
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Table 1b: Number and percentage of loan attributes cited by partici-
pants who incorrectly preferred or identified the higher cost loan as a 
function of condition (Enhanced vs. Regular) in Experiment 1. For 
instance, 21 participants who reviewed the regular loan versions in-
correctly preferred the higher cost loan. Of these participants, 12 
(57.1%) cited the interest rate when evaluating which loan was less 
expensive overall. 
 Enhanced  Regular 
PREFERENCE
(N = 12)
COST
(N = 10)
PREFERENCE
(N = 21)
COST
(N = 21)
N PARTICIPANTS (%) N % N % N % N % 
APR 1 8.3 1 10.0 2 9.5 1 4.7 
Closing costs 2 16.6 2 20.0 4 19.0 5 23.8 
Interest rate 5 41.6 3 30.0 12 57.1 10 47.6 
Fees 1 8.3 1 10.0 4 19.0 2 9.5 
5 year comparison 5 41.6 5 50.0 6 28.5 4 19.0 
Monthly Payment 3 25.0 0 0.0 3 14.2 5 23.8 
Loan Amount 1 8.3 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 
Total interest % 1 8.3 0 0.0 3 14.2 5 23.8 
Total Loan Cost 0 0.0 0 5.6 0 0.0 1 4.7 
Long Term Cost 0 0.0 0 5.6 0 0.0 1 4.7 
Not Classifiable 0 0.0 1 10.0 1 4.7 1 4.7 
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Table 2: Number and percentage of participants who cited a particu-
lar loan attribute when responding to the Preference question (“If you 
were going to replace your mortgage with a new mortgage, which 
loan would you prefer to take out? Why?”) and Cost question 
(“Which of these two loans is less expensive overall? And how did 
you decide which of the loans was less expensive?”) as a function of 
condition (Enhanced vs. Regular) in Experiment 2. 
Enhanced Regular
PREFERENCE
(N = 20)
COST
(N = 20)
PREFERENCE
(N = 21)
COST
(N = 21)
N PARTICIPANTS (%) N % N % N % N % 
APR 3 15.0 3 15.0 0 0.0 2 9.5 
Closing costs 3 15.0 4 20.0 3 14.3 9 42.9 
Interest rate 3 15.0 5 25.0 11 52.4 9 42.9 
Fees 1 5.0 3 15.0 0 0.0 2 9.5 
5 year comparison 4 20.0 5 25.0 7 33.3 6 28.6 
Monthly Payment 1 5.0 2 10.0 3 14.3 0 0.0 
Loan Amount 2 10.0 1 5.0 1 4.8 3 14.3 
Total interest % 0 0.0 0 0.0 1 4.8 0 0.0 
Not Classifiable 6 30.0 5 25.0 4 19.1 0 0.0 
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Table 3: Number and percent of participants across Experiments 1 
and 2 who cited problematic terms or features that increase the likeli-
hood a borrower will default in making payments on their home loan. 
“+” represents correct and “-” represents incorrect. The answers we 
were seeking are noted in the discussion of this Table 3 in Section II. 
Nevertheless, we marked some answers we were not seeking as credit 
when they were still overall accurately responsive to the question. 
FEATURE N(%) OF  PARTICIPANTS
Variable Rate (+) 35(30.2)
Balloon Payment (+) 18(15.5)
Increase in property taxes (-) [not a loan term] 7(6.0)
High interest rates (+) 16(13.8)
Length of loan (+) 1(0.9)
Expensive monthly payments (+) 5(4.3)
No option to refinance (-) [not a permitted loan term] 2(1.7)
Lose of job/income (-) [not a loan term] 6(5.2)
High pre-payment charges (+) 2(1.7)
Hidden fees (+) 2(1.7)
High late fees (+) 6(5.2)
High closing costs (+) 2(1.7)
Fixed interest rates (-) [not problematic per se] 1(0.9)
Lack of borrower understanding (-) [not a loan term] 5(4.3)
No answer (-) 33(28.4)
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Table 4: Number and percent of participants across Experiments 1 
and 2 who identified these actions as ones lenders can take after a 
borrower defaults to recover the debt due.  The “+” and “-” signs in-
dicate which responses were considered correct and incorrect, respec-
tively. The answers we were seeking are noted in the discussion of 
this Table 3 in Section II. Nevertheless, we marked some answers we 
were not seeking as “+” when they were still somewhat accurately re-
sponsive to the question. We coded “Restructure or modify loan 
terms” correct since it could lead to enabling the borrower to cure the 
default and repay the debt. We coded “Charge higher interest rate” 
since it is unlikely that lenders can do this if there is no authority to 
unilaterally do so under the loan documents. We coded “Give more 
time” as correct as it could lead to curing the default and the lender 
recovering the debt. We coded “Charge late fees” as incorrect as it 
doesn’t enable the borrower to cure the default and repay the debt and 
is not much of a leverage to get the borrower to repay if they are able. 
We coded “Damage credit” as correct as it is leverage lenders can use 
to extract some of the money due from some borrowers in default. 
ACTIONS N(%) OF PARTICIPANTS
Restructure or modify loan terms (+) 4(3.4)
Foreclose on home/take back property (+) 55(47.4)
Seize other assets/properties (+) 14(12.0)
Charge higher interest rate (-) 8(6.9)
Give more time (+) 1(0.9)
Charge late fees (-) 17(14.7)
Sue/take legal actions (-) [Too vague] 27(23.3)
Place lien on home (-) [Mortgage lien already ex-
ists] 1(0.9) 
Damage credit (+) 10(8.6)
Increase payments (-) [Meaning unclear] 2(1.7)
Go to government (-) [Meaning unclear ] 1(0.9)
No answer (-) 24(20.7)
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Appendix: Mathematical modeling of how APR changes as a func-
tion of how long a loan is held. 
Of the two loans used in Experiments 1 and 2, one loan had 
an interest rate of 3.125% on a loan amount of $277,968 and total 
loan costs (Category D. TOTAL LOAN COSTS [A + B + C] on the 
CFPB’s home loan disclosure form) of $19,458, giving this loan an 
APR of 3.71% assuming that the loan is held for 30 years. The other 
loan had an interest rate of 3.2% on a loan amount of $276,006 and 
total loan costs of $15,180, giving it a lower APR than the first loan 
of 3.65% assuming it is held for 30 years. With these particular loans, 
the second loan with the lower APR is always the less expensive one 
across the life of both loans. This can be demonstrated by calculating 
APR assuming that the house is sold and the loan paid off early in a 
balloon payment. Doing this, the second loan with an APR of 3.65% 
assuming that it is held for 30 years is still less expensive than the 
first loan with an APR of 3.71% assuming it is held for 30 years even 
if each were paid off early at 20 years (in which case the second loan 
would have an APR of 3.70% versus 3.76% for the first loan), 7 years 
(APR of 4.18% for the second loan versus 4.38% for the first loan), 
or one year (APR of 9.03% for the second loan versus 10.60% for the 
first loan). The reason for this, however, is that the difference in in-
terest rate 0.075% is so small relative to the large difference in loan 
costs of $4,278. 
Often, however, when one loan has higher loan costs and the 
other loan has a higher interest rate, it will take time before that be-
comes the lower cost loan. For example, if the interest rate on the 
first loan with higher closing costs were lowered to 3.0% (which 
would then be 0.2% below the interest rate of the second loan), then 
the first loan would have an APR of 3.58% assuming that it is held 
for 30 years, which is lower than the second loan’s APR of 3.65% as-
suming that it is held for 30 years. But, it would not have a lower 
APR if it were only held for 1 year (10.47% for the first loan versus 
9.03% for the second loan) or even 7 years (4.25% for the first loan 
versus 4.18% for the second loan). But it would have a lower APR if 
held for 20 years (3.63% versus 3.70%). 
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Appendix. The CFPB home loan disclosure form that 
was used in these experiments. This version of the 
disclosure form was the preliminary version that the 
CFPB sent out for comments. The final version is 
virtually identical.
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